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ABSTRACT 
 
The problem of Scepticism has long haunted the Philosophy of Mind—a particularly 
noxious form of Scepticism is articulated by John Locke’s problem of Inversion. The 
problem of inversion acts to undermine two of the dominant theories of mind: 
Functionalism and Representationalism. In this thesis, the origin of the problem of 
inversion is examined alongside the damage it causes to both Functionalist and 
Representationalist theories of mind. Through this examination, the problem is 
demonstrated to be uniquely Cartesian in nature. After this has been demonstrated, 
attention is then turned to articulating a theory of perception that does not rely on the truth 
of the Cartesian system of mind. This alternative perceptual system draws upon the work 
of the Existential Phenomenologists, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Martin Heidegger, in an 
effort to demonstrate the redundancy of the Cartesian paradigm. By doing such, a 
dissolution of the problem of inversion and a more realistic model of perception are both 
advanced. A number of objections to the alternative, phenomenologically sympathetic 
model of perception are then rebutted.  
 
KEY WORDS: Inversion, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenal Consciousness, 
Phenomenal Objectivism, Cartesianism, Perception, Phenomenology, Representationalism, 
Functionalism, Scepticism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
	
The notion of Inverted Qualia is one that will be familiar to vast swathes of people; 
especially so to those with children, or those who can remember their own idle ruminations 
from childhood. Stripped of its glamourous title, it is essentially an extreme case of the 
kind of difficult questions associated with experiential uniformity—wondering if your 
experiences are aligned with those of your peers is the natural pastime of every child 
enamoured with that green of the leafy canopy above him, or every teenager repulsed by 
their first taste of coffee, sitting confused amongst the easy sips of the café around him. 
Due to the difficulties of answering these kinds of questions though, they are often clipped 
by busy parents or pushed to the back of one’s mind, freeing up their attentional capacity 
to pursue something more useful. After all, it doesn’t seem to matter at all if two people 
share the same experience of the world around them. ‘Leaves look green to me and 
everyone knows what I mean when I say that they are green, so everyone must see them in 
the same way as me’ is the conclusion most commonly employed to justify not paying 
these kinds of questions due attention. Although these doubts of experiential uniformity do 
not necessarily interfere with the everyday workings of one’s life (only a very slender 
section of humanity loses sleep wondering if their red is our red), they are far from 
harmless.  
 
Think for a second. What is the most important tool for the surgeon? Surely, it is the 
scalpel? What of the architect—is it their drafting pencils? It doesn’t seem as though a 
chemist would be able to do their work without the appropriate glassware, just as a 
Guitarist without a guitar is next to useless. Each and very profession adds value into the 
world through the skilful manipulation of a set of tools, specific to the industries to which 
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they belong. Indeed, we can on some level identify professions on the basis on the tools 
which they use—an author without a pen is indistinguishable from a plumber without his 
tool-bag. But there also seems to be a more fundamental possession universal to all 
professions, all human achievement, which is just as vital to success as these other tools. A 
tool that is often ignored: our senses. The collective achievements of humanity rest upon 
our senses. A surgeon could not operate if she could not see what she is doing, or feel the 
resistance of the flesh underneath her scalpel. An Architect could not draw up the plans for 
a building if they could not see their drafts and nor could a pianist fill a concert hall if they 
had no manner of sensing the music which they play. The entirety of human achievement 
rests upon our senses, but we do not yet understand our senses. We know that if we are to 
open a door, we have to grab the door handle before us, but we can’t properly explain how 
we come to know that the door handle was there for us to grab. We resort to explaining this 
phenomena with vapid statements: “we see it”. But the whole process of seeing, of sensing, 
is not robust enough to serve as the basis of humanity’s achievements—even the bored 
child asking his mother whether his green is her green is able to shine light upon our 
shortcomings. Our senses are only useful to us insofar that they let us access our worlds. 
The possibility that worldly experiences may differ imperceptibly between agents is a 
dressed-up reformulation of the notion that our senses do not allow us to access our worlds 
with any convincing veracity. Until we quash the weakness in veracity that inversion 
articulates, we miss out an important factor of our intellectual story.   
 
It is precisely this venture which the thesis endeavours to contribute to. Within, it hopes to 
highlight the mistakes in philosophical history that lend the problem of inversion its 
potency and set out an alternative group of theories to allow us to move away from the 
problematic past. With this move also comes the dissolution of the problem of inversion—
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it is only of any philosophical significance if we endorse the erroneous theories of the past, 
so to move away from these is to render inversion philosophically uninteresting.  
 
The thesis begins with an exploration into the modern origins of the problem of 
Inversion—rightly, its first articulation is traced back to the John Locke’s An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding. The metaphysical beliefs of John Locke are first 
explored and it is argued that, despite his self-confessed sympathies to Substance Dualism, 
Locke presents a theory unusually sympathetic to contemporary physicalist metaphysics. 
What this metaphysical system means for our perceptual capabilities is explored. The 
paper then turns its eye towards a discussion of Lockean Metaphysics of Mind and the 
characteristics that physical thinking matter may take. Once this discussion has been 
concluded, the background to inversion scenarios is set and the paper explores Locke’s 
articulation of the problem of inversion and his assertion that inversion may not be overly 
problematic anyway.  
 
Of course, inversion would not have endured as a thorn in the side of Philosophers of Mind 
if it were not problematic—the paper next endeavours to illustrate the damage that 
inversion causes to two dominant theories of mind, Hilary Putnam’s Functionalism and 
Michael Tye’s Representationalism. To begin this process, what is meant by inversion is 
made clear: it is an occurrence where an observer receives qualia from an object that are 
not properly consistent with its objective nature. With this established, the next step of 
articulating the destructiveness of inversion scenarios is demonstrating their feasibility. 
Clearly, if inversion scenarios are not possible, there is no point in worrying about them—
that which does not exist cannot cause any problems. This though, is not so—inversion 
scenarios are possible, as will be illustrated. Following the demonstration that inversion 
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scenarios are possible, the paper turns to the difficulties Functionalism faces when 
presented with inversion scenarios—it is ultimately concluded that inversion demonstrates 
Functionalism explanatorily incomplete. The same conclusion is drawn following the 
exploration of Representationalism. Inversion scenarios cause their damage by positing 
occurrences that the theories cannot explain.  
 
The thesis, in its third section, turns its attention to how we can negate the problem of 
inversion. Both Functionalism and Representationalism are shown to be operating within 
the same paradigm—a paradigm that arises as a consequence of Descartes’ famous Cogito. 
The paradigm is articulated and its characteristics are isolated before then showing how 
Functionalism and Representationalism map onto these characteristics. It is the fact that 
these theories operate under the guise of this paradigm that causes their problems. Through 
the analysis of the work of Martin Heidegger, it is shown how the paradigm itself is 
problematic as it causes us to view humanity in a misleading way—an alternative 
paradigm, capable of explaining the way that we are with greater accuracy is then 
introduced and explored, as are the motivations to choose this alternative paradigm over 
the traditional Cartesian one.  
 
In its final section, the paper takes the ideas linked with Heidegger’s alternative paradigm 
and shows the impact that they have upon our perceptual capacities. The traditional theory 
of perception—which says our perceptions are constructed of atomistic ‘sensations’—is 
articulated and then demonstrated to be unattractive by way of appealing to the work of 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty’s holistic theory of perception is offered as an 
alternative to the traditional constructivist theory of perception. This alternative theory 
places a greater emphasis upon the arena in which perceptions occur than the traditional 
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theories of perception—it is shown, by reference to real world examples of such 
occurrences, that the environment in which we perceive things is capable of influencing its 
quality. Finally, it is shown how we can render the problem of inversion uninteresting 
through abandoning the Cartesian Paradigm in favour of the alternative articulated in this 
work.
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CHAPTER ONE 
MAKING MARIGOLDS OUT OF VIOLETS: THE ORIGINS OF THE 
INVERTED QUALIA PROBLEM 
 
1.1 LOCKE’S METAPHYSICS1 
 
To fully understand Locke’s Inverted Qualia Problem, it is first necessary to have an 
understanding of what he thinks there is in the world. This is because the Inverted Qualia 
Problem is intrinsically linked with perception and the very notion of perception is 
groundless without some kind of metaphysical theory—one cannot perceive nothing. One 
cannot talk about perceiving something without also making a proto-metaphysical 
commitment. To suggest that one sees the trees for they are there before you appears 
innocuous, but upon reflection it prompts the question of “in what capacity are the trees 
there before me?” It is questions of this kind that sit at the heart of any metaphysical 
enquiry. They form the foundations on which we can talk about our perceptions and the 
relation they have with our world, one simply cannot have a sensible conversation about 
our perceptual relations with the world without a theory of what the world is.  
 
1.1.1 LOCKE: DUALIST, MATERIALIST OR IDEALIST? 
 
The most basic question that one can ask of any metaphysician concerns the identity of the 
substances of the world. There are two major camps in which one can find oneself when 
talking of metaphysics: that of the Monists, who believe that there is a single kind of 
substance in the world and that of the Dualists, who believe there are two kinds of 
																																																						
1 As is customary, any reference to Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding shall be cited in 
book.chapter.section format.  
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substance in the world. For Dualists, there are both immaterial and material substances 
existent in the world—mental substances and physical substances respectively. Monists 
deny that there is a dualism of substance and instead solely endorse either the immaterial, 
the material or the neutral. 
 
Locke’s Metaphysical beliefs are somewhat unusual and their complexity is not aided by 
the lack of harmony within the scholarly literature. Whilst there is no debate that Locke 
flirted with Dualism, there is debate regarding the extent he endorses it. There are two 
conflicting views. Jonathan Bennett (1994) notes that Locke is sympathetic to Descartes’ 
Property Dualism but stops short from endorsing his Substance Dualism—Locke is loath 
to make such a large commitment. Locke’s enquiry into the possibility of ‘thinking matter’ 
seems sympathetic towards Materialism, yet Locke states that those who wish to know the 
truth of Materialism with certainty “will scarce find [their] Reason able to determine 
[them] fixedly for, or against the Soul’s Materiality” (4.3.6. p.542) and thus Locke remains 
agnostic towards Cartesian Dualism. Other Scholars, specifically Matthew Stuart (2016. 
p.73) and E.J. Lowe (2005. p.61), suggest that Locke is undeniably a substance dualist but 
not without need of clarification. Locke is not a Cartesian Dualist, but does endorse a 
duality of substance—the immaterial and the material are equally at home within his 
metaphysics although the immaterial is reserved solely for deities. 
 
 I take the view that Locke is indeed a Substance Dualist, but not in the Cartesian sense—
though he undeniably endorses a duality of substance, Locke’s Metaphysics is closer to 
Materialism than it is to Dualism. The entities that he claims as immaterial go some way as 
to explaining why Locke does not wholly endorse Materialism: consideration has to be 
made for the notion that Philosophy does not occur in a vacuum. The entities that Locke 
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claims are immaterial all have religious significance and thus, their inclusion into his 
metaphysical theories may potentially have been done to sate his religious convictions. 
Although such a notion is undoubtedly speculative, it could potentially offer some insight 
into his agnosticism towards the nature of substance and the subsequent difficulties in 
ascertaining his metaphysical position. Due to this notion, in combination with the 
practical consequences of Stuart’s (2016. p.73) claim that Locke is an Immaterialist in 
respect to Gods only—the vast majority of the objects of interest in the world remain 
physical—the thesis shall treat Locke, where appropriate, as a Materialist.  
 
1.1.2 LOCKE ON THE WORLD 
 
In the 17th Century, Science was undergoing a paradigm shift. Traditional scholastic 
science was under ever increasing scrutiny. The Scholastics endorsed a metaphysics from 
the Aristotelian tradition: objects of the world are composed of the unification of an 
immaterial and other-worldly form and a mass of nondescript physical matter (Sheridan, 
2010. p.34–36). A tree bereft of the form of a tree would be nonsensical—it would only be 
a collection of physical matter lacking properties. Though widely accepted in the 17th 
century, this Aristotelian conception of objects did not enjoy universal assent. The 
conception was challenged by Locke’s contemporaries who endorsed a metaphysics that 
somewhat resembles our modern day metaphysical theories.  
 
Locke’s Metaphysics was indubitably influenced by his contemporaries. Locke 
championed an atomistic conception of the world (Lowe. 2005. p.61ff). He posited that all 
physical objects were ultimately constructed of minute, imperceptible particles called 
corpuscles (op. cit., 2010. p.37–39).It is these corpuscles that Locke believes to be the 
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fundamental substance of all material objects of the world; from trees to mugs to pens, all 
material objects are composites of these imperceptibly small particles. This theory prompts 
a few questions, namely: “what are corpuscles like?” and “if all objects are constituted out 
of the same fundamental material, why do different objects prompt different phenomenal 
experiences?” 
 
To answer the first of these questions, one has to look at what Locke termed Primary 
Qualities. Corpuscles have a number of qualities ubiquitous in all material objects. These 
qualities are those such as size, location in the world, extension and shape. It is impossible 
to take these qualities away from material objects—it is only possible to change them 
(2.8.9). For example, if one takes a tree and turns it into a set of planks there is an 
irrefutable change in the size, shape and location of the object, but both the standing tree 
and its processed planks still have a size, a shape and a location. Qualities such as these, 
which cannot be divorced from an object are Locke’s Primary Qualities.  
 
In addition to Primary Qualities, Locke also speaks of Secondary Qualities. Secondary 
Qualities are the more complex of the two kinds of quality. Whereas Primary Qualities 
resemble the objects we experience, Secondary Qualities do not (2.8.15). Secondary 
Qualities instead are a kind of power to produce ideas, such as ‘yellowness’, ‘vividness’ 
and ‘bitterness’ within us (2.8.8). As Secondary Qualities only exist in the form of a 
power, it cannot be said that the object in question is actually yellow, vivid or bitter. But 
then what is the relationship between Primary Qualities and Secondary Qualities? If, as 
Locke suggests, all of the objects of the world are made from corpuscular matter, it makes 
sense that the matter of each object should be arranged in a different manner—a pen, by 
virtue of its different shape and size, clearly must have a different corpuscular arrangement 
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to a desk. It is from these different corpuscular arrangements that Secondary Qualities 
arise. A blue flower is blue because its corpuscles are arranged in a ‘blue’ manner (Stuart, 
2013. p.79). It is important to note though, that a ‘blue’ arrangement does not actually 
make the flower blue, it only makes the flower appear blue. The flower, in reality, is 
colourless (Stuart, 2016. p.75). Corpuscles have no colour associated with them, it is their 
arrangement that is key—a single corpuscle is as at home in a ‘red’ configuration as it is in 
a ‘yellow’ one. This means that Secondary Qualities exist in the form of an object’s power 
to cause within us a particular phenomenal experience (op. cit., 2013. p.79ff). Ideas such as 
‘redness’ are never instantiated in the world, they are only ever prompted to arise in our 
minds via configurations of corpuscular matter.  
 
Locke claimed that ideas were the basic units of our thoughts (2.2.2). Locke uses the term 
‘idea’ in relation to both pre-conceptual ‘raw feels’ and entities which result from 
conceptualisation; the particular pinkness of a rose and the notion of a soldier are both 
valid examples of Lockean ideas (Lowe, 2005. p.25). Ideas themselves are never truly 
instantiated in the world—in reality both ‘pinkness’ and soldiers are nought but 
configurations of matter—yet are acquired through two avenues: sensation and reflection 
(2.1.3–4). Ideas acquired through sensation are those acquired via the interaction between 
the material world and our sense organs and, as such, they consist of ideas with 
phenomenal significance. Bitterness, brightness, coldness and timbre are all examples of 
such ideas (2.1.3). Ideas acquired through reflection are distinct from ideas acquired 
through sensation: they require that the agent has already had a number of phenomenal 
experiences from which they have acquired ideas and thus are born from the reflection of 
how the mind itself operates in relation to these ideas (2.6.1). Examples are concepts such 
as belief, willing and thinking (2.1.4). There is a further distinction that Locke makes with 
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ideas: the ideas discussed so far have been examples of simple ideas, Locke also speaks of 
complex ideas (2.2.1). As with Locke’s corpuscular theory of matter, Locke’s theory of 
ideas is also constructivist and atomistic—simple ideas can be combined to make complex 
ideas (2.7.10). It is best to illustrate this with an example: a glass of wine. The idea of a 
glass of wine is a complex idea, and thus, it is possible to deconstruct the idea and be left 
with a number of simple ideas; colour, darkness, solidity, motion, sharpness, dryness and 
warmth, amongst others.  
 
 As was mentioned earlier, the simple ideas that constitute complex ideas are acquired 
through sensation or reflection, either discreetly or working in concert. These ideas are 
evoked in the mind, ultimately, because of the arrangements of the corpuscular matter of 
an object thus ideas such as ‘yellowness’ are never properly instantiated in the world. This 
seems innocuous until one highlights that this entails that the objects of the world are not 
as they appear—there is a disjunction between appearance and reality. This disjunction can 
be elaborated upon: because the objects of the world have the power to prompt certain 
ideas to arise in us and these ideas are the most fundamental units of our thoughts, it 
follows that reality is epistemically mediated by ideas. This entails that the real essence of 
an object—i.e., that which it truly is (corpuscles in Locke’s Metaphysics)—is always 
obscured by the ideas it prompts (Lowe, 2005. p.34). One can never directly access what a 
‘blue’ corpuscular arrangement is, because it is obscured by the blueness itself—we 
perceive not the real essence of an object but instead can only access an object’s nominal 
essence. This notion—that we can only access sense data produced by objects rather than 
the objects themselves—is known as the veil of perception and it introduces a level of 
scepticism to Locke’s metaphysics (ibid. p.41ff).  
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1.2 THE MATERIAL OF THOUGHT: LOCKE’S METAPHYSICS OF MIND 
 
As we have stated before, Locke’s metaphysics is unusual. His theory is unique because, 
his metaphysical claims are always tainted by his Pyrrhonian sympathies—Locke, aware 
of the limits of human knowledge, always stops short of endorsing the absolute truth of his 
claims. This means an opposing theory can always be conceived. This is felt at it strongest 
when Locke talks about the metaphysical status of the mind. Whilst Locke does irrefutably 
have Dualistic proclivities—he argues extensively for the existence of an eternal, 
immaterial thinking being—these proclivities are not without sceptical qualification. 
Indeed, Locke does not explicitly exclude the possibility of conscious matter: he 
(admittedly in the interests of setting up arguments to be knocked down) posits a number 
of hypotheses that could account for the existence material thought within an eternal 
thinking being. These hypotheses must be taken seriously in the context of Locke’s 
Dualism of Substance, simply because there are no philosophical tensions between his 
brand of Substance Dualism and the claim that the human mind is material. The existence 
of two substances does not entail that the two substances are necessarily juxtaposed—
purely material bodies are completely fathomable within Locke’s metaphysical framework 
(Stuart, 2016. p.73). When Locke presents arguments for the existence of God these are, in 
effect, arguments for the existence of a purely immaterial being and there is no reason that 
this purity of substance cannot cut both ways. As such, the metaphysical arrangements 
Locke posits as a sufficient account of material consciousness will be explored in turn.  
 
We shall begin by exploring Locke’s questioning of whether consciousness could be 
explainable by reducing mental activities, such as thinking, willing and believing, to the 
physical properties and mechanistic interactions of and between particles. Such a theory 
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has a distinctly Lockean character as it, in essence, equates mental states with primary 
qualities: being in mental state X means that one is also in a corresponding physical state. 
Locke expresses limited scepticism towards this view. He claims that it makes little sense 
to attribute the existence of thought to the mechanistic interactions of a number of 
particles, themselves lacking perceptual abilities (4.10.5). This seems to neutralise this 
theory immediately, but it is important to note Locke’s frame of reference—he claims this 
to be impossible in relation to God, but not to humanity. Locke does not condemn the 
notion that God makes conscious beings (op. cit., 2016. p.76). Indeed, Locke explicitly 
claims that it is impossible to know whether “[God] has not given to some Systems of 
Matter … a power to perceive and think” (4.3.6, p.540). Because of this, it is possible to 
make the claim that thinking matter could exist in humanity, but not in God, because it is 
God that transforms matter into thinking matter. Thus, such an argument pertains only to 
questions concerning the ultimate origin of thinking matter—as we are concerned not with 
its genesis, but its existence the issue remains only with a narrower scope. Instead of being 
applicable to all thinking entities, the theory is now only applicable to humanity. 
 
1.2.1 MECHANICAL THINKING MATTER 
 
If it is possible that the existence of thinking matter is due to God’s volition, one can be 
forgiven for prying into what it is God has done to transform mindless unaware systems of 
matter into conscious beings. Stuart (2016) claims that Locke posits several views as to 
how material consciousness could arise. The first of these is found within the work of 
Michael Ayers. Ayers (1993. 2, p.148) concedes that Locke is correct, the erratic and 
arbitrary interactions between material particles cannot feasibly constitute any form of 
sentience. Although, hidden within Locke’s claim is a suggestion which Ayers is keen to 
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capitalise upon—if arbitrary interactions between particulate matter provide an insufficient 
basis for the genesis of consciousness, it may be so that the measured and deliberate 
manipulation of the machinations of matter does constitute a sufficient basis for 
consciousness. It is precisely this that Ayers argues—the arbitrary movements of particles 
are useless, but it is not arbitrary particulate movements that constitute thinking matter; the 
movements in thinking matter are divinely ordained. Such a theory is neat, for it seems to 
mirror other notions in the world—in a similar way that motion begets motion, it seems 
proper that one would need to put deliberate thought into something to get deliberate 
thought out. The neatness of a theory though, does not mean it is what Locke intended. 
Ayers’ interpretation seems troubling. In essence, it entails that there is a particular 
arrangement of matter, only possible through God’s volition, “fitly disposed” (4.3.6. p.540) 
to acquire the ability to think. If consciousness is due to a particular system of matter, with 
particles moving in a particular ‘thinking matter’ pattern, it is entirely possible that the 
particular ‘thinking matter’ pattern may have arisen organically by chance and thus, 
according to Stuart (2016. p.77), this undermines Locke’s claim that consciousness is 
necessarily a product of God’s volition, thereby rendering this interpretation untenable.  
 
This is not necessarily the case. The interpretation from Ayers may well be in line with 
Locke’s intentions. For instance, it is possible to attribute God with ultimately causing 
consciousness, purely through the insistence that God caused the matter that constitutes it 
to exist originally. If God caused the matter to exist, it follows that all of the machinations 
of the matter are in some manner attributable to him. This notion provides cohesion with 
other Lockean concepts. It sits alongside Locke’s religious convictions with little trouble 
and more importantly, aligns with Locke’s thoughts on freedom. If one is to accept that 
God is ultimately responsible for the machinations of matter, it entails a form of 
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Determinism. If one assumes the God Locke speaks of reflects the standard Christian 
conception of God, i.e. omnipotent, omniscient and benevolent, and one also accepts that 
God brings all matter and the laws that govern it into existence, it follows that the 
machinations of the matter are also somehow constrained by God’s volition. If one then 
accepts that mental states are based on physical configurations of matter, the Principle of 
Transitivity would deem them similarly constrained. Therefore, it is so that one’s actions 
are somehow determined, not in the sense that Mental State Y is necessarily preceded by 
Mental State X, but in the sense that there are a finite number of mental states in the pool 
that could precede Mental State Y. Such limitations can be elucidated by an appeal to a 
pair of dice—one cannot throw a thirteen, but one is free to throw any number between 
two and twelve. Such a notion is largely in keeping with Locke’s compatibilist sympathies 
and thus, it may be so that Ayers’ interpretation of Locke is correct by virtue of its 
cohesion with wider Lockean thought. 
 
1.2.2 ALTERED ESSENCE THINKING MATTER 
 
Another theory explored in Stuart (2016) concerning thinking matter comes from Lisa 
Downing. Downing (2007) argues that Locke suggests that it is entirely possible for 
consciousness to arise as a consequence of God manipulating matter in such a way that its 
properties are no longer solely material. The essence of material objects is divinely 
manipulated in such a manner that they gain non-mechanistic properties that are 
explanatorily sufficient for consciousness (Downing, 2007. p.365–369). In short, 
consciousness is matter with the correct ‘thinking matter’ essence and normal matter is 
matter without a correct ‘thinking matter’ essence. There is a certain tension with this 
theory. As suggested by Leibniz (ibid., p.366), to add the capacity to think to a collection 
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of matter seems arbitrary—Leibniz claims that all of the qualities of an object need to be 
explainable by nature of the object, to change the qualities one needs to explain the change 
in quality. Downing (ibid., p.369–373) asserts that her interpretation avoids this criticism 
by stating that such a change would naturally entail a change in the real essence of the 
object (i.e., what the object truly is), but that change is obscured as only the nominal 
essence (i.e., what the object appears to be) of the object is available to us. It only seems 
like there has been no change to the material because there has been no change to its 
nominal essence. This response, by utilising the obscure nature of the ‘we-know-not-what’, 
seems viable only because it seems that there is no manner in which we could disprove 
it—to prove that the addition of non-mechanistic properties entails a change in the real 
essence of the object one would need to puncture the veil of perception. This is not to 
suggest that Downing’s interpretation is impervious from attack by virtue of its refuge in 
obscurity—if it is in contention with other notions of Locke’s Philosophy it would be 
demonstrated untenable. This is precisely the avenue of attack that Stuart (2016) pursues.  
 
Stuart (ibid., p.77–78) highlights that such a theory would be difficult to reconcile with 
Locke’s claim that that God is immaterial—Downing’s claim would mean that God is 
material. To guard against this attack, Downing (2007. p.376–380) concedes that her 
theory would make God material, but not standardly material—God would be constituted 
of the special ‘thinking matter’ material. This, she claims, is well within the framework 
that Locke constructs. To evidence the claim that Locke did not rule out that God was 
made from the ‘thinking matter’ material, Downing employs some textual analysis. She 
claims that the manner in which Locke talks about the immateriality of God, only acts to 
rule out matter bound entirely by solidity and extension. As Downing’s ‘thinking matter’ 
material is not bound entirely by its physical properties, for it also has the immaterial 
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features that allow for consciousness to arise, it would be exempt from Locke’s definition 
of material. This reading, though clever, simply is not what Locke intended. As Stuart 
(2016. p.78) highlights, during correspondence with Bishop Stillingfleet, Locke clarifies 
his definition of matter as “an extended solid substance”, even going as far to say that 
“wherever there is such a substance, there is matter”. This is where Downing’s reading 
becomes untenable. Even if one accounts for the lexical differences between the 17th 
century and the present day, it seems clear that Locke intends not to label matter as that 
with only extension and solidity, but instead intends to label anything with solidity and 
matter as material. So, whilst the alteration of the essence of a substance to give it the 
capacity for consciousness may explain ‘thinking matter’, the inconsistencies with Locke’s 
assertion that God is immaterial would render this interpretation of Locke’s work incorrect. 
 
1.2.3 FLOATING PROPERTIES THINKING MATTER 
 
There is also a third substantive reading that avoids appealing to Locke’s epistemic 
modesty. This reading is very much informed by Downing’s theory. Whereas Downing 
believed that the capacity for consciousness resulted from God manipulating the real 
essence of an object, this third reading claims that the capacity for consciousness results 
from God adding such a capacity to a material object without altering the object’s real 
essence (ibid., p.78–79). This claim goes some way to neutralising some of the criticism 
levelled towards Downing’s claim: it allows Locke’s God to remain immaterial and thus 
soothes the tensions between material thinking beings and immaterial thinking beings. As 
such, Stuart argues that this is the interpretation closest to Locke’s intentions. 
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This though, seems to be where its merits end. Such an interpretation seems arbitrary at 
best—asserting that consciousness is present in humanity because God made it so lacks the 
usual philosophical clout characteristic of Locke’s work, and, indeed, it can even be seen 
as contradictory to Locke’s Empiricism. This is not only because the addition of 
consciousness cannot be empirically verified but also because it is unclear how such a 
notion could operate. Material addition entails alteration of matter—ungrounded 
immaterial addition is completely unfathomable. We simply cannot know if, or how, God 
‘adds’ consciousness to us—a scepticism that Locke would be loath to endorse. It is 
because of this opaqueness that we can dismiss this interpretation—in the light of Locke’s 
wider work it does not appear viable. 
 
1.2.4 FURTHER THINKING MATTER THEORIES 
 
There are two more theories concerning how thinking matter could have come to arise that 
Locke spoke of. We shall start by looking at the weaker of the two theories.  
 
The weaker of these two theories states that all consciousness could have arisen from “only 
one atom” which is capable of thought (4.10.15. p.626). This notion is not appealing 
simply because there is nothing to differentiate the single instance of thinking matter from 
a single instance of standard matter apart from its ability to think—there are no physical 
grounds on which you could distinguish the thinking matter above the rest of the matter in 
order to account for this ability. It therefore becomes impossible to argue for this position 
owing to the adage: ex nihilo nil fit—there is no way that we can account for the thinking 
matter’s ability to think without positing another instance of thinking matter, but if we 
should do this, it voids the original premise—there would not be only a single atom of 
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thinking matter and thus, the claim that consciousness arises from a single thinking atom is 
incoherent, thereby damaging the viability of this interpretation. 
 
The stronger theory suggests that consciousness arises not from “only one atom” (ibid) but 
from the fact that all material particles have consciousness (4.10.14). Locke dismisses this 
theory upon the basis that Panpsychism would undermine that which makes God unique—
Panpsychism would entail an innumerate amount of eternal thinking beings (Stuart, 2013. 
p.252–256) and because God is necessarily unique it can be safely asserted that this is not 
the interpretation Locke intends. 
 
The interpretation posited by Ayers’ (1993) seems to be the closest to what Locke intended 
when he spoke of how one could account for material consciousness—the cohesiveness 
with Locke’s wider philosophy is undeniable and thus it is more plausible to assert this 
interpretation over its competitors, all of which suffer from problems cohering with 
Locke’s wider thought in one way or another. Ayers’ interpretation is also interesting 
because it appears to be the one with the most potent philosophical merit; it contains within 
it one of the central tenets of contemporary Physicalist Philosophy of Mind—that mental 
states are somehow linked with physical configurations of matter.  
 
1.3 LOCKE ON THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
In the previous section, we established that Locke presents a notion of material 
consciousness that is remarkably advanced for a Philosopher operating in a the 17th 
Century. But unfortunately, such foresight does not offer much insight into the nature of 
consciousness itself—positing that consciousness is a product of material processes does 
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not tell us what consciousness is, in much the same way that saying a house is made from 
bricks and mortar offers little insight into its architectural style. This is not to say that one 
cannot find any insight into consciousness in Locke’s work. Indeed, in typical fashion 
Locke’s scepticism has given rise to a number of competing conceptions of consciousness. 
We shall now explore them. 
 
1.3.1 CONSCIOUSNESS AS INTERNAL SENSING 
 
There are those who believe that Locke intended to conflate his notion of consciousness 
with his notion of perception. Clearly, the plausibility of this assertion is dependent on 
what is meant in regard to ‘perception’—the nature of consciousness could change with 
each competing definition of the word. A standard usage of the term is none too dissimilar 
from sapience—perception, under this definition, would simply be the ability to sense 
things, to feel them, in much the same way as one feels the warmth of the sun on a 
summer’s day. This is not strictly the definition that Locke intends. The definition of 
perception most sympathetic to Locke’s intentions is that of awareness—the apprehension 
of a present ‘something’. Of course though, this only paints half of the picture. We cannot 
have a comprehensive understanding of what consciousness is without knowing just what 
it is that we are aware of. Graciously, Locke makes this explicit: “consciousness is the 
perception of what passes in a man’s own mind” (2.1.19. p.115). This seems to suggest 
that Locke deems consciousness to be the awareness of one’s being in a particular mental 
state, or, in other words, the being aware of one’s own awareness. This theory shares a 
great deal of conceptual ground with Higher-Order Theories of consciousness. For 
instance, William Lycan (1995)—who ratifies the interpretation of Locke above—claims 
that consciousness should be thought of as the awareness of Lower-Order mental states or 
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processes, e.g., being in receipt of specific sensory stimulus. Similarly, David Armstrong 
(1981. p.723–728) argues for the existence of Introspective Consciousness—a notion best 
elucidated through the ‘zoning out’ that occurs when one performs a lengthy action at 
which they are proficient. To ‘zone out’ in such a manner is to become temporarily lacking 
in introspective consciousness. Indeed, both of these notions seem to echo Locke’s claim 
that humans “think without being conscious of it … a man is always hungry, but … he 
does not always feel it” (2.1.19. p.115). Both theories envisage consciousness, to employ 
an analogy, as the spymaster sitting in his office, actively tracking the whereabouts of his 
agents whilst they simultaneously send back reports of their situations.  
 
There are two objections that can be levelled at this conception of consciousness. The first, 
as noted by Weinberg (2008), is that it causes unwanted conclusions when it is combined 
with Locke’s assertion that the ability to reflect—i.e., the ability to observe one’s mental 
states, must be acquired: it would mean that before a person acquires the ability to reflect, 
they lack consciousness. This is an odd claim—to deny a pre-linguistic infant 
consciousness on the basis that it cannot reflect upon its mental states seems absurd. Locke 
does hint at a way to get out of this bind—he states that ideas of reflection (i.e., those that 
are acquired through internal monitoring) “pass [through the mind] continually yet … they 
make not deep impressions enough to leave in the mind clear distinct lasting ideas: (2.1.8. 
p.107). This suggestion seems impotent until one combines it with a notion found within 
Leibniz’s critique of Locke’s Essay: there are perceptions that pass through the mind 
unnoticed because of their diminutiveness and thus, must be combined with other 
perceptions to pass the threshold at which one begins to perceive them (1765. §55). It may 
be so that ideas of reflection are of this kind and those who have not acquired them have 
not done so because they need to be scrutinized before they become opaque; the Lower-
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Order mental states are present within the minds of pre-linguistic infants waiting to be 
uncovered. This notion would seem to be somewhat troubling for Locke, for in his diatribe 
against Nativism, he claimed that there were considerable difficulties in arguing that there 
are ideas in the mind of which one was not aware. This though is not applicable in this 
case. Locke is not claiming that the ideas of reflection in a pre-linguistic infant are wholly 
obscured—he instead argues that the infant has a kind of awareness of the ideas which is 
insufficient for their clear perception; to quote Locke, the awareness of the Lower-Order 
mental states come in the form of “floating visions” (2.1.8. p.107) rather than opaque, 
substantial ideas of reflection. It seems that this theory consciousness stands up well to this 
objection. 
 
Another, more serious critique comes as a consequence of the structure of consciousness 
such Higher-Order conceptions of consciousness endorse. If consciousness is the Higher-
Order awareness of Lower-Order awareness it would follow that Higher-Order awareness 
is no less of an awareness than the Lower-Order awareness and thus, would need a 
‘Higher-Higher-Order’ state to be aware of it, so on and so forth. As noted by Leibniz 
(1765. §118), such a scenario would cause an infinite regress which itself would entail an 
agent to become infinitely transfixed upon their original thoughts—a notion that is clearly 
nonsensical. Attempts have been made to circumvent this problem by claiming that 
“consciousness must be a relational property” (Rosenthal, 1986. p.354), specifically the 
“property of being accompanied by higher order thoughts” (ibid.). It would seem though, 
that such a solution does little to assuage Leibniz’s critique—it does not seem that we can 
claim that consciousness is simply a kind of relation without severely misrepresenting 
what consciousness is. Consciousness is not a relational property between mental states—it 
has its own discrete existence. It is a thing in its own right. Therefore, we cannot escape 
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the regress by saying consciousness is a relational property, because that is not what 
consciousness is. Leibniz’ regression still stands and thus, the ‘Higher-Order’ 
interpretation of Locke’s formulation of consciousness is rendered unpersuasive.  
 
1.3.2 AN ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
There is, though, a manner in which one can overcome Leibniz’ regression. To do this, one 
has to look at an alternative way in which Locke’s work may be interpreted. This 
alternative conception attempts to account for the awareness of awareness found within 
Locke, without falling fowl of Leibniz’ regression. It does so by collapsing the Higher-
Order and Lower-Order layers of the ‘Internal Sensing’ model of consciousness into each 
other. It posits that a conscious experience is a hybrid, capable of being split along the 
lines of sensory data and intentional content—a notion dismissed by Rosenthal (1986) due 
to his belief it did not solve the regression. To superimpose this notion onto to Locke’s 
work and thus make clear its coherency: the receipt of the sensory data provides the raw 
data from which one can acquire ideas and the intentional content acts to make us aware 
from what source we have acquired these ideas. In addition, as we also acquire ideas via 
reflection upon the workings of our mind, it must be so that the intentional content of the 
conscious experiences that give us ideas of reflection must be conscious experiences 
themselves. This would mean that for conscious experiences, there must be an intrinsic 
element of intentional reflexivity; as stated by Weinberg; “every act of perception has two 
objects … the idea … [and] … the perception … itself” (2008. p.26). It is clear how this 
would escape Leibniz’ regress. There is no Higher-Order state to sit above the perception 
to cause the regression; so despite the hybridity of conscious experiences, the two 
constituent parts—the sensory data and the intentional content—sit within the same 
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brackets. There are no tiers—no higher states or lower states—present to cause the regress. 
This notion of ‘hybrid’ conscious experiences also seems to be able to account for why 
pre-linguistic children are unable to acquire ideas of reflection—the reflexive intentional 
content of those conscious experiences is absent. It is because this conception of 
consciousness is able to both escape Leibniz’ regression and cohere with Locke’s claim 
that our reflective capacities must be acquired, that Weinberg is correct to endorse this 
conception of consciousness as closest to what is intended by Locke in his Essay. 
 
1.4 THE INVERTED QUALIA PROBLEM 
 
Allow us to look back on what we have achieved so far. We began by exploring Locke’s 
Metaphysics, concluding that Locke endorses a Dualism of Substance but reserves 
immateriality for God alone (Stuart, 2016. p.73). Indeed, it is possible to strip away the 
theistic elements of Locke’s metaphysics and be left with a material conception of the 
world, none too dissimilar to a conception held by mainstream physicalist philosophy 
today. Although, there is an intrinsic element of scepticism within Locke’s metaphysics—
as we can only ever access the nominal essence of an object, not its real essence, such that 
we can never verify the true nature of the objects of the world (Lowe, 2005. p.41ff). The 
true nature of reality is hidden behind a veil of perception.  
 
After exploring Locke’s general metaphysics, our attention turned to the notion of material 
consciousness. We established that Locke leaves clear the conceptual space needed to 
argue for the possibility that God has imbued particular “systems of matter” (4.3.6. p.540) 
with the capacity for consciousness—attention was turned to what the nature of this divine 
manipulation could be. The notion that consciousness could be ‘tacked on’ to material 
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beings, as suggested by Stuart (2016) was shown to be at odds with Locke’s empiricism 
and thus an untenable interpretive candidate. Similarly, Downing’s (2007) notion that the 
divine manipulation occurs within the real essence of an object conflicts with Locke’s 
assertion that God is immaterial and thus is also untenable. Finally, the notions that “every 
particle of matter thinks” (4.10.14. p.626) and “only one atom [thinks]” (4.10.15. p.626) 
were also shown untenable due to their unintended consequences—Panpsychism would 
entail inordinate amounts of eternal thinking beings and the ‘single atom’ theory privileges 
a single instance of atomic matter with no real grounding for doing so. Thus, because 
Ayers’ (1993) theory avoids these cohesive difficulties, and itself coheres well with some 
of Locke’s wider thought it was chosen as the interpretation that resembles Locke’s 
intentions the closest. This also had the added benefit of being in line with the beliefs of 
swathes of contemporary Physicalist Philosophy.  
 
Finally, Locke’s conception of consciousness was examined. We dismissed a conception 
of consciousness based upon Locke’s notion of perception on the basis that it prompted an 
infinite regress. Instead, a conception of consciousness that claimed that all conscious 
experiences have two kinds of intentional content—an external kind and an intrinsic 
reflexive kind—was argued for.  
 
A curious problem arises from Locke’s model of the world. As we have stated prior, the 
ideas we acquire when we look upon an object are not due to those ideas being truly 
instantiated—a lemon is not instantiated yellowness—but instead, these ideas are 
ultimately dependant on the matter of the object being configured in a manner sympathetic 
to the idea—lemons are configured for yellowness. Indeed, Stuart (2016. p.75) interprets 
Locke as asserting that “no object has any colour to it when it is not being observed” thus 
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entailing that colour exists as a configuration of corpuscles alone. As such, it does not 
seem to be incorrect to claim that if an object is configured in a “yellow’ manner it cannot 
also be configured in a ‘purple’ way—if this were so, it would contravene the principle of 
non-contradiction. Yet Locke claims that it is possible for identically configured agents to 
look at one object, configured in an identical manner and receive from it two different 
ideas: “a violet [may] produce in one man’s mind … the same [ideas a] marigold 
produce[s] in another man’s … and vice versa” (2.32.15. p.389).  
 
The knee-jerk response to this occurrence would be to assert that one of the agents is 
mistaken, but as Locke suggests: one phenomenal experience is as valid as any other 
(2.32.16) and thus the issue remains. Locke suggests that the strange scenario is not a 
particularly contentious issue—a notion he bases on the fact that such an inversion would 
be largely undetectable. Say Alice and Belle look upon Locke’s violet and Alice receives 
the ‘violet’ ideas from the flower and Belle receives ‘marigold’ ideas, provided both are  
fluent in the same dialect both would use the same words when talking of the flower—“the 
names would [not] be at all confounded” (2.32.15. p.389). Both Alice and Belle could 
happily converse about the flower with not a hitch. This is because, as Locke seems to 
suggest, the terms associated with phenomenal experiences—e.g., yellow—are set within 
the community to which an agent belongs, but the reference of the term—i.e., the 
phenomenal experience it picks out—is set privately by the agent themselves (2.32.8–9). 
So long as such a disjunction between the conventional, public conditions for correctly 
using the term  and its internal reference exists, according to Locke, such inversion would 
be imperceptible. Although, Locke does seem to make a nod towards the potential 
difficulties of the inversion—he claims that when an object “produces constantly the 
[‘incorrect’] idea” (2.32.15. p.389) within an agent the agent will “regularly distinguish 
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things for his use by those appearances” (ibid.), but this contains the implication that if the 
inversion was not consistent the agent would not be able to do so and thus the inversion 
would not be as imperceptible as Locke posits. This does not seem to concern Locke—he 
even suggests that it could be of little interest to endeavour to ascertain whether or not the 
phenomenal experiences of particular objects retain intra/interpersonal uniformity claiming 
that to do so would offer no “improvement of our knowledge or conveniency of life … so 
we need not trouble ourselves with it” (ibid.). Such a view is mistaken. The inversion 
problem noted here causes considerable problems in contemporary Philosophy of Mind, 
regardless of its manifest perceptibility. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
TO SEE THINGS EYE TO EYE: INVERSION AND ITS DESTRUCTIVENESS 
 
2.1 WHAT IS INVERSION? 
 
If we are to examine the effects of inversion, it would be prudent to define inversion with 
greater clarity. To begin with, we should look at the metaphysical backdrop to inversion 
problems. 
 
We live in a world filled with objects. Each of these objects possesses a certain surface, 
that reflects light a certain way, which in normal individuals under normal conditions, 
prompts an experience of a particular quality. For example, light reflected from a post-box 
found in a sleepy English village will prompt a particular experience—in this specific 
instance, we use the colour term ‘red’ to refer to both the light-reflecting property of the 
post-box and the quality of the experience that it prompts. The light-reflecting property of 
the post-box is thought to exist independently of observers and thus, we shall use the word 
‘objective’ to signify when we talk of these worldly properties. Similarly, we shall be 
using the term ‘phenomenal’ to signify when we are talking of the experiential qualities 
that the ‘objective’ properties prompt.  
 
With this backdrop set and terminology settled, we can now introduce the notion of 
inversion. Say we have two agents—David and his friend. David is inverted. One day, he 
and his friend are on a stroll when they chance upon a strawberry plant, heavy with ripe 
fruit. These strawberries are objectively red—they have the quality of reflecting ‘red’ light. 
David though, does not have a red phenomenal experience. If it were possible for his 
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uninverted friend to access his experience, he would use the term ‘green’ to describe it. 
David is completely unaware of this mismatch of objective properties and phenomenal 
qualities. Like his friend, he naturally calls the strawberries ‘red’ and he also recognises 
the fruits as ripe—he is not deterred from eating them. It is just so that his phenomenal 
experiences are imperceptibly mismatched with the objective qualities of the world (Tye, 
1995. p.26–27) 
 
The inversion scenario explained above is known as Interpersonal Inversion. There is also 
a second kind of inversion—Intrapersonal Inversion—that pertains to an agent whose 
spectrum has been inverted during their lifetime. This means that the standard frame of 
reference, where objective red is properly coupled with phenomenal red, is not set within a 
population (as is so with Intrapersonal Inversion) but is instead set by the inverted agent’s 
own experiences at a time before they have become inverted. This Intrapersonal version of 
inversion shall be ignored here, primarily because it would be revealed in the inverted 
agent’s behaviours—they can simply tell you that their red has been replaced with green2.  
 
2.2 ON THE FEASIBILITY OF INVERSION 
 
Discussion of inversion is without any potency if one cannot also demonstrate that 
inversion scenarios are possible; if they are impossible any examination is in vain. 
Inversion scenarios base their viability on the notion that the inversion is undetectable, 
therefore to deny that a person can experience a spectral inversion would be akin to 
asserting that Schrödinger’s Cat is certainly alive and well—one lacks the privileges 
																																																						
2 This suggestion is, admittedly, disingenuous. It may be so that the inverted agent may be unable to report 
on their inversion. If the world were inverted alongside the agent, as per the Inverted Earth scenario (Block, 
1990), the agent would not be aware of their inversion. This though, seems to be ad hoc in nature and thus is 
disregarded above. 
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required to make a rational claim either way. Yet, there are those who would deny the 
possibility of spectral inversion. For instance, Clyde L. Hardin (1987) argues that the 
spectrum cannot be inverted by virtue of the non-chromatic phenomena of colour 
experiences. Non-chromatic phenomena are best explained by contrasting them with their 
antithesis, chromatic phenomena. Whereas chromatic phenomena pertain explicitly to 
colour and would be referred to with terms such as red, bright or dark, non-chromatic 
phenomena are not coloured. They are the kinds of phenomena usually spoken of in terms 
such as warm, hard or cool. Hardin argues for the impossibility of inversion on the basis 
that humans have at least three binary chromatic channels; one responsible for the 
perception of red and green, another for blue and yellow and a third for the darkness or 
lightness of the perceived colour. These channels are receptive to the chromatic 
phenomena produced by the objects of the world: should one look upon a canary, it will 
stimulate activity towards the ‘yellow’ end of the relevant channel. Hardin then notes that 
the extremes of each channel, i.e., red/yellow and blue/green, each carry with them 
different non-chromatic phenomenal experiences—red and yellow carry ‘warm’ 
experiences and green and blue carry ‘cold’ experiences. Should then spectral inversion 
occur, one of two scenarios could ensue:  
 
a. The non-chromatic phenomena would also be inverted and the affected would 
see ‘red warm’ things as ‘blue cold’ things. This would lead to a situation 
where the inverted person’s experiences would be totally divorced from their 
actions—for example, they would still huddle around a campfire for warmth 
despite its glacial appearance. 
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b. Only the chromatic phenomena would invert, leaving the non-chromatic 
phenomena unchanged, thus leading to “red cold” or “blue warm” experiences. 
Experiences such as these are nonsensical on the basis that one supposedly 
identifies a ‘red’ experience, not solely based on its chromatic properties, but 
also on the basis that it prompts ‘warm’ experiences. Warmth is a feature of 
redness, in just the same way that ‘red’ is.  
 
These possibilities force the defender of inversion into one of two positions: they either 
have to accept the first scenario and concede that if inversion of human spectra is possible, 
it entails that the quality of our experiences have no causal efficacy, or they must abandon 
inversion because it would lead to the creation of contradictory and unstable nonsenses.  
  
Such concessions do not have to be made. As noted by Joseph Levine (1991) the chromatic 
and non-chromatic phenomena associated with a ‘red’ experience are not as inseparable as 
Hardin would have us to believe. They are instead atomistic; one can separate ‘warmth’ 
from a red experience just as one can separate ‘coldness’ from green experiences. One can 
separate the different phenomenal experiences because it is not only the perceived 
‘warmth’ of red experiences that allows them to be distinguished, one can also distinguish 
them purely from the ‘coloured’ phenomena they carry. Indeed, this is also consistent with 
common sense—by denying that phenomenal experiences may be atomistic, Hardin is 
(implicitly) endorsing the view that one could not recognise objects as red if one did not 
also possess the concept of ‘warmth’. Thus, because it seems that one can separate the 
chromatic and non-chromatic constituents of a phenomenal experience, it is possible to 
take the non-chromatic parts of an experience and apply them to a different chromatic 
experience—the “conceptual incoherence” that Hardin (1987. p. 292) speaks of is simply a 
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blind assertion; ‘red cold’ is entirely fathomable so long as one posits that phenomenal 
experiences are atomistic. Therefore, if one is prepared to accept the notion that 
phenomenal experiences may be split into parts, it seems that Hardin’s assertion that 
human colour-space—i.e., the range of colours humans are capable of perceiving—is 
unable to be inverted due to asymmetries in non-chromatic phenomena is untenable, thus 
leaving the path to inversion free from obstacles.  
 
If one is not prepared to accept Levine’s atomistic conception of phenomenal experiences, 
there is a more robust argument for the feasibility of inversion. Let us say that one rejects 
Levine’s thoughts—the possibility of inversion is still not neutralized. If we concede that 
our physiology does not lend itself to a range of chromatic perceptions that are readily 
invertible, one does not also have to concede that there is no being whatsoever with 
physiology conducive to inversion. Indeed, it is a common trope that different animals 
have different colour-spaces—octopods are supposedly only to see shades of blue for 
instance—so it does not take too much imagination to posit a creature with a colour-space 
conducive to inversion. The claim that our colour-space is unable to be inverted is just that; 
our colour space may not be invertible, but that does not mean that all colour spaces are 
invulnerable to inversion (Shoemaker, 1982). Therefore, so long as the possibility of one 
of these invertible creatures existing remains, inversion remains feasible. 
 
2.3 FUNCTIONALISM AND INVERSION 
 
Now that we have a working definition of inversion and demonstrated that it is, at the very 
least, logically possible for inversion to occur, it is time to turn our attention to the 
problems caused by inversion. We shall begin by looking at the difficulties that inversion 
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causes functionalist theories of mind, but first, it will be prescient to establish what such 
theories entail.    
 
2.3.1 WHAT IS FUNCTIONALISM? 
 
Imagine there is a farmer, long ago, before any of our modern meteorological 
advancements. It is around the time of the year where the seeds need to be sown if he is to 
get enough crops to sell later in the year. He has invested a large sum of the previous 
year’s income on seeds and, rationally, he does not want to head into the fields to plant 
them if a storm is on its way—not only will he get wet, his investment will be wasted 
should the seeds wash away. To predict the weather will be a great boon, so he observes 
the morning sky. It appears red. He then looks to the pasture holding the cattle—they are 
all reclining underneath an oak tree. Finally, he opens the farmhouse door and fills his 
lungs with the cool morning air. It carries upon it the earthy scent of an impending storm; 
the seeds will not be planted today.  
 
The red morning sky, the reclining cattle and the earthy scent carried in the air are all 
clearly very different entities, yet it can be said that they all have something in common: 
they all provide the farmer with the ability to predict the weather. They all share the same 
‘weather-predicting’ function, despite their wildly different makeup. This is not dissimilar 
to the way that Functionalists think of mental states. To the Functionalist and the Farmer 
alike, it matters not what is providing the function, only that the function is provided. What 
this means for the Philosophy of Mind can be better illustrated if one contrasts 
Functionalism with the Type Identity Theory. The Identity Theory claims that each and 
every mental state has a physical counterpart, in such a manner that if one is in the 
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arbitrarily named, Brain State X, they are also in the corresponding Mental State (Kim, 
2011. p.91–129). This allows one to make type-identity statements about mental states, for 
example, one could assert that “Pleasure is the transmission of Dopamine along the 
Mesolimbic Pathway into the Nucleus Accumbens”. Under the Identity Theory the onus is 
on what a mental state is. This is not so with Functionalism. Functionalism cares not what 
a mental state is but instead, what it does. Whereas the Identity theorist would claim that 
there is no pleasure without the transmission of Dopamine along the Mesolimbic Pathway 
into the Nucleus Accumbens, the Functionalist claims that pleasure exists as a kind of 
mental ‘computer program’, and can be instantiated anywhere capable of ‘running’ the 
program (Putnam, 1967) 
 
This likely needs some explanation. A mental state, to a functionalist, is a particular kind 
of functional state. A functional state can be thought of, in a rudimentary way, as a set of 
instructions. For example, imagine one is baking some scones: one follows the recipe. It is 
possible to think of ‘baking’ as referring to a set of actions, which follow instructions 
much like a flowchart, i.e., there are inputs which are acted upon in certain manner to 
reach an output. (Think of whisking eggs—the eggs are the input, ‘whisking’ the 
functional state and whisked eggs are the output). This is how the Functionalist views 
mental states—mental states are those which carry out the instructions on how to move 
from one state into another. Appropriate inputs for the Functionalist are either sensory or 
psychological—burning one’s arm and thinking about Tennis are both examples—and 
appropriate outputs for the functionalist are either behavioural dispositions or further 
psychological states—for instance, the disposition to emit a coarse utterance or thinking 
about strawberries and cream. It is the functional mental state that provides the bridge 
between input and output.  
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This is the framework that Functionalism follows, but there is a distinction to be made 
between two kinds of Functionalism. The first, we shall pay passing attention to as it is 
better categorised as a variant of the Identity Theory than a purely Functionalist theory. 
This theory finds its roots within the Identity Theory, and shall be referred to as Brain State 
Functionalism, or BSF (Block, 1980. p.179–181). BSF agrees with the claim that mental 
states are functional states, but it also claims that these functional mental states also have a 
corresponding physical twin (Lewis, 1969). For example, say we take pain to be the mental 
state that causes bodily damage to manifest itself in a coarse utterance, BSF would assert 
that pain would be identical to physical state in the brain (for instance, C-Fibres firing) that 
is then responsible for the disposition to act in a certain way (Armstrong, 1970).  
 
The second kind of Functionalism is a more scientific variant, and thus shall be known as 
Scientific Functionalism (Scientific Functionalism shares much of its conceptual repertoire 
with Machine Functionalism) (Block, 1980. p.173–175). Scientific Functionalism, first 
advanced by Putnam (1967), stops short of making the identity claims found within BSF 
and instead asserts that mental states are definable by function only. Whereas BSF would 
claim that “Pain = C-fibres firing = the brain state that turns bodily damage into coarse 
utterances”, Scientific Functionalism would instead assert that “Pain = the state that turns 
bodily damage into coarse utterances”. Indeed, Scientific Functionalism believes that such 
functional definitions can be provided for all mental states. This is interesting because of 
what Robert Kirk (1994, p.89–92) calls The Swiss Cheese Principle—by defining mental 
states purely by their function means that there is nothing ‘special’ about the brain; it is not 
composition, nor material that makes the mental, only function alone. This means that it is 
theoretically feasible to construct a synthetic humanoid that, provided it had functional 
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parity with a normal ‘fleshy’ humanoid, would be fully conscious. Let us explore this 
further.  
 
2.3.2 OF SYNTHETIC HUMANITY 
 
On the face of things, the prospect of a synthetic human does not seem implausible. If 
mental states are somehow related to brain states, and brain states are (to simplify things 
somewhat) based upon electrical activity, it follows (per Kirk’s Swiss Cheese Principle) 
that anything that can replicate the electrical activity of the human brain can act as its 
replacement. This is the grounding for the Functionalist trope of “Neurone Replacement 
Therapy”—if Functionalism is a complete theory of mind then the gradual replacement of 
Neurones with functionally identical synthetic counterparts will cause no damage to 
consciousness (Kirk, 1994. p.88–89). But consciousness is complex. There are many 
different ‘kinds’ of consciousness and if Functionalism cannot account for each kind then 
it cannot be a complete theory of mind and thus, the notion of synthetic consciousness is 
relegated to the world of science fiction alone. 
 
For the sake of simplicity, allow us to assert that there are roughly three ‘kinds’ of 
consciousness. The first we borrow from Ned Block (1995): Access Consciousness. 
Access Consciousness, is a mental state that is “poised to be used as a premise in reasoning 
… [or for the] rational control of action and … speech” (Block, 1995. p.231). It is easy to 
see how Functionalism can account for ‘access’ kinds of consciousness—the mental 
‘access’ states are those that have the function of transmitting information to our cognitive 
faculties. This seems to be replicable in silicon (indeed, the ability to transmit information 
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is the basis of the Internet) and thus, we can assume that the synthetic agent would possess 
Access Consciousness.  
 
The second kind of consciousness is one commonly associated with Higher-Order Theories 
of consciousness: Introspective Consciousness. This kind of consciousness is best 
elucidated by showing an example where it is not present—when one is driving, and one 
does so reflexively and so proficiently that one does not know how one arrived at their 
destination, they are introspectively unconscious (Armstrong, 1981). This means that 
Introspective Consciousness is an awareness of the operations of the mind itself—a 
reflexive relaying of information—much like a boiler monitoring its own temperature so it 
knows when to click off. Again, it is easy to envisage a functional explanation of 
Introspective Consciousness. It is simply a kind of state that monitors another state and 
makes that information available to other faculties. This function does not seem unable to 
be replicated in silicon and thus, we have good grounds to assert that our synthetic 
individual would possess Introspective Consciousness. 
 
The final kind of consciousness is Phenomenal Consciousness. This is the kind of 
consciousness that has qualitative character— there is a something it is like to be in a 
phenomenally conscious state (Chalmers, 1996. p.11-16). It is here where the synthetic 
agent begins to struggle. As we know, Functionalism identifies and defines mental states 
on the grounds of their function, i.e., what causes them, and what they themselves cause. 
Now, Phenomenal Conscious states are mental states and thus, a difference in qualitative 
character entails a difference in mental state. A phenomenal experience of ‘greenness’ 
entails a different mental state than a phenomenal experience of ‘redness’ for instance. Say 
then, we look at the experiences of our inverted individual, David, and his spectrally 
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normal friend. Were they to look upon the same bunch of objectively green grapes, David 
would be having a phenomenally red experience and his friend would be having a 
phenomenally green experience—and thus they are in two different phenomenally 
conscious states. These two states have the same causal input (seeing the grapes) and they 
also both ‘do’ the same thing (they both, perhaps, make their holder think of wine), so the 
functionalist will assert that both David and his friend are in the same mental state, due to 
their functional parity. But to do this denies the notion that each qualitative state requires 
its own mental state—David and his friend are not at all in the same mental state by virtue 
of their different experiences (Fodor, 1981). Inversion shows that Functionalism leaves 
phenomenal character out in the cold—qualitative states seem to escape functionalistic 
reduction—and thus, our synthetic agent will lack qualitative states and therefore will not 
enjoy the same level of consciousness as a ‘fleshy’ agent. The possibility of synthetic 
agents stands with the completeness of Functionalism, and thus, because Functionalism is 
incomplete synthetic agents are not tenable.  
 
2.4 REPRESENTATIONAL THEORIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND INVERSION 
 
As we have seen, inversion highlights the incompleteness of Functionalist theories of 
consciousness, but this is not the only damage it does. Inversion also acts to cause 
considerable problems for representational theories of mind.  
 
2.4.1 THE FOUNDATIONS OF REPRESENTATIONALISM 
 
Whereas Functionalism argues that mental states are those with particular functional 
purposes, Representationalism relies on the argument that all mental states are intentional. 
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Intentionality has little to do with deliberate action, and is instead a term used to refer to 
the ‘aboutness’ of mental states. Let me provide an example of this ‘aboutness’. Say for 
instance one is in an art gallery and one looks upon Henri Matisse’s famous Blue Nudes 
one can say that they are ‘about’ the female form, in much the same way that the little blue 
lines on the map one used to navigate to the venue are ‘about’ the rivers they represent. 
Representationalism is the claim that all mental states possess this ‘aboutness’; that “every 
mental phenomenon is characterised by what … [is] called the intentional … inexistence of 
object … [identified by its] reference to a content [and] direction towards an object” 
(Brentano, 1874. p.68) This notion is not too contentious and is reasonably easy to 
understand. Say you look outside briefly, turn to your friend and say, “it’s raining outside”, 
your utterance is the verbalisation of a mental state—a belief—that is ‘about’ the weather. 
If one has a state, and that state is about something (i.e., it possesses intentional content) 
then that state is a mental state. This practice of identifying mental states on the basis on 
presence of intentional content was reformulated some years later, by Michael Tye to 
provide a theory of Phenomenal Consciousness. 
 
2.4.2 A REPRESENTATIONAL THEORY OF PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
Tye, in the same vein as Brentano, asserted that “all states that are phenomenally conscious 
… have intentional content” (1995. p.93). This, in short, means that to be in a state where 
there is a something that it is like for you to be in that state, that state is ‘about’ something. 
Say that one is in a bar and one orders a glass of gin. One is in a particular state before one 
sips the gin. Then, when one sips the gin and experiences the juniper sting of the gin one is 
in another state. When the aftertaste of the gin is no more, one returns to their pre-sip state 
(provided relevant ceteris paribus laws are stipulated). It can be therefore said that the 
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change in state ‘tracks’ the taste of the gin. This means that the ‘gin-taste’ state carries 
information about the physical properties of the gin in much the same way that the 
presence of smoke carries information about the presence of a fire; the ‘gin-taste’ state is 
about the presence of pinene and limonene in the chemical constitution of the gin. This 
means that phenomenal quality does not arise from the ‘gin-taste’ state nor does it arise 
from the presence of specific aromatic chemical compounds—it arises from both in 
tandem. This is largely intuitive—one cannot expect to be in a ‘gin-taste’ state without 
drinking gin nor can one know that one is drinking gin without also being in a ‘gin-taste’ 
state. Because of this co-dependence one can safely assert that phenomenal experiences are 
replicable so long as they are ‘about’ the same physical properties of the objects of the 
outside world (Tye, 2005. p.45). This notion goes some way in explaining why the taste of 
gin is often evoked whilst walking in coniferous forests—the trees and the drink contain 
the same aromatic compounds and thus produce qualitatively similar states.  
 
2.4.3 CHARACTER AND PANIC 
 
The bare assertion that all phenomenal states possess intentional content is in need of some 
consideration. Relating phenomenal states to intentional states seems to neglect the notion 
that there are mental states that are not in possession of phenomenal quality. To return to a 
previous example, the belief that it is raining carries intentional content—the belief is 
‘about’ the weather—but carries no phenomenal content. One cannot draw a comparison 
between ‘gin-taste’ states and ‘believes-its-raining-states’ for one cannot feel that they 
believe it is raining in the same way that one can feel the taste of gin.3 Perceptively, Tye 
																																																						
3 This notion, that beliefs are without phenomenal character, is admittedly disputed (for example, in Pitt, 
2004) and it is relatively easy to supply anecdotal evidence in support of the notion, as I am sure anyone who 
has had the answer to a trivia question on ‘the tip of the tongue’ can attest to. Yet, we shall forgo proper 
discussion of this notion, for the sake of brevity.  
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pre-empts this objection. What is meant by intentional content must be qualified before 
one can assert that there is something it is like to possess it—it must meet the criteria set 
by the PANIC theory. 
 
PANIC theory asserts that intentional content must also be poised, abstract and non-
conceptual if it is to qualify as phenomenal character (Tye, 1995. p.137–144). This will 
benefit from some clarification. Intentional content is said to be poised if it created by our 
sensory organs and is available to the cognitive processes responsible for the creation of 
the kind of mental states that lack felt quality, e.g., beliefs and desires. Considerable 
parallels can be drawn here with Ned Block’s notion of Access Consciousness—both 
pertain to states that are positioned in such a way that they are readily accessible to 
cognitive faculties. Indeed, this notion also sheds light as to why mental states such as 
beliefs are thought not to possess phenomenal quality—beliefs etc. are not poised for the 
uptake into our cognitive faculties because they are a part of our cognitive faculties. 
Phenomenal experiences provide the raw building blocks from which we can create 
beliefs—we have beliefs about phenomenal character, not vice versa. Intentional content 
can be described as abstract if it does not necessarily pertain to a particular object. Say for 
instance we taste over-brewed coffee and burnt chocolate brownies—the particular bitter 
quale can be shared by both objects. Both over-brewed coffee and burnt chocolate 
brownies will cause identical changes in state (provided the correct ceteris paribus laws 
are stipulated). Finally, intentional content can be said to be non-conceptual if one does not 
need to possess the relevant concept to experience it. For example, one does not need to 
know that pain represents bodily damage in order to experience its felt quality. This 
criterion is largely stating the obvious yet is necessary to prevent a key problem—if one 
had to possess a concept before one could experience that which the concept refers to, it 
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would prompt unanswerable questions regarding the origins of the concepts. If intentional 
content satiates these criteria there is something that it is like to be in possession of this 
content, according to Tye. 
 
2.4.4 ON INVERSION AND REPRESENTATION 
 
Now that we have a working account of what a representational theory of consciousness 
entails and how it accounts for phenomenal experiences, it seems an apt time to introduce 
inversion into the equation. Inversion should, at this point, need little explanation—one 
agent would experience an objectively red object as phenomenally red whereas an inverted 
agent would experience the same object as phenomenally green. This concept though, is 
intensely problematic to proponents of representational theories of consciousness. 
Inversion leads to a scenario where a single worldly object may, with no misrepresentation 
occurring, be accompanied by two different phenomenal experiences (Shoemaker, 1994). 
This is incompatible with the view that phenomenal character is a kind of intentional 
content—even with the criteria posited by PANIC theory—as the quality of a phenomenal 
experience is set by the object being represented. The possibility of inversion entails one of 
two scenarios:  
 
a. Provided no misrepresentation occurs, inversion shows that phenomenal quality is 
not set by the objects of the world because the notion that a single object can be, for 
example, both red and green simultaneously violates the principle of non-
contradiction. This would mean that phenomenal content is not intentional and 
representational theories of consciousness are to be discarded due their explanatory 
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insufficiencies (i.e, their inability to provide a representational account for 
phenomenal quality). 
 
b. Provided no misrepresentation occurs, the damage that inversion seems to entail 
can be mitigated through illustrating that an object can be red and green 
simultaneously without violating the principle of non-contradiction. Thus, there is 
no problem with asserting that phenomenal content is intentional and 
Representational theories of consciousness are therefore explanatorily complete 
and should not be discarded.  
 
Sydney Shoemaker (1994: 2000) argues for the latter of these Scenarios.  
 
2.4.5 SHOEMAKER AND THE FEASIBILITY OF RED-GREEN OBJECTS 
 
Shoemaker’s (1994) efforts to protect representational theories of mind from the damaging 
effects of spectral inversion begin with the assertion that the phenomenal quality of an 
object is not possessed by an agent’s experience of the object but instead is a property of 
the object itself—if an agent has a red experience when confronted by a strawberry, it is 
because that strawberry is red. This assertion is useful for two reasons. The first is that it 
avoids what Shoemaker terms ‘Projectivism’. If one claims that the quality of an object is a 
property of the experience of it, one is applying properties to the object that it may not 
necessarily have. If the redness of the strawberry is a property not of the strawberry, the 
strawberry itself could be any colour or it could be colourless: it is hidden behind a veil of 
perception. The second reason is, by attaching phenomenal quality to the objects of the 
world, Shoemaker is effectively denying that one can attach truth-values to perceptions—
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perceptions are not wrong nor right, they simply are. Following these two reasons, 
misrepresentation is impossible.  
 
This is important, because if misrepresentation is impossible, it follows that an inversion 
scenario illustrates that the standard and inverted agents are picking out genuine features of 
objects through their perceptions. It would seem therefore, that an object can indeed be red 
and green at the same time.  
 
It is understandable to find this implausible—it goes against our common sense theories of 
the world to assert that a single object can be red and green at once. If Shoemaker is to be 
persuasive he must also provide a framework where such a notion is possible. If both 
inverted and standard agents are picking out a feature of an object it is clear that they 
cannot be picking out the same feature (for if they were, they would see the object in the 
same way). To solve this, Shoemaker posits the existence of a class of properties he terms 
phenomenal properties. It is these that a phenomenally conscious state is ‘about’ (and thus, 
the physical feature of the world represented by the appropriate change of state). This 
notion will benefit from some unpacking.  
 
Say we have an object. Alongside size and shape, this object possesses a number of 
phenomenal properties. Let us say it has four such properties. The object is then presented 
to a group of five people: Anne, Brian, Charles, Desmond and Eric. When Anne views the 
object, the intentional content of her state is the first phenomenal property. She sees the 
object as blue. Brian’s state represents phenomenal property two and he sees the object as 
red. Charles’ state represents phenomenal property three and the object is yellow to him. 
Desmond’s state represents phenomenal property four and he sees the object as green. 
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Finally, Eric sees the object in the same way as Anne—blue—so it follows that their 
experiences are about the same phenomenal property.  
 
It is clear now, how this scenario seems to absorb the problem of inverted qualia. The 
qualia are not inverted at all, it is just so that a standard and an inverted agent pick out two 
different properties of the physical object. There is also seemingly no issue with asserting 
that phenomenal consciousness is intentional—to experience an object in a particular way 
is to have an experience ‘about’ a particular feature of the object. It seems therefore that 
Shoemaker has neutralised the destructive potential of spectral inversion.  
 
2.4.6 SHOEMAKER’S PROBLEMS 
 
Whilst on first glance it seems as though Shoemaker has solved the problems inversion 
causes, this is not so. Firstly, it appears that Shoemaker is tacitly asserting that each 
physical object has an infinite number of physical phenomenal properties. Allow me to 
explain. Colour is not individualistic; it does not exist in discrete units like it does on an 
artist’ palette. It instead exists in a spectrum. To illustrate this point we can appeal to a 
similar phenomenon that occurs within time. Whilst we can say that there are 24 hours in a 
day, 60 minutes in an hour and 60 seconds in a minute—we can also keep dividing seconds 
into milliseconds, nanoseconds and so forth, infinitely. This is also true with colours. If we 
say that Phenomenal Property A is represented by a veridical red experience and 
Phenomenal Property B is represented by a veridical blue one, it could be said that a 
veridical purple experience can be explained through the representation of a third 
phenomenal Property. Should colours be individually supported by discrete qualities (i.e., a 
state for each colour, as Shoemaker (1994) suggests) it follows that there will be a physical 
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quality for each hue, shade, tint etc. and as one can always split the difference between two 
similar colours, each object is in possession of an infinite amount of physical properties. 
One could always retort with the claim that human colour perception is not so fine grained 
that one can always split the difference between two colours but this objection can be 
sidestepped—human colour space may not be sufficient for such sensitive chromatic 
demarcations but there always exists the possibility that there is a creature with sufficiently 
sensitive perceptual functions. Even if it is not impossible that an object possesses an 
infinite number of physical properties, the endorsement of such a notion incurs a 
significant ontological burden so it makes sense to be weary of the notion.  
 
Secondly, if we are to accept that inversion can be explained through the representation of 
different physical properties of an object, we are left with the problems: “why do I 
perceive this property, not that property?” and “I perceive this property now, what is 
stopping me from perceiving that property should I shift my gaze from the object and back 
again?” One can claim that it is something to do with one’s physiology—it may be so that 
it precludes the perception of certain colours for instance. Similarly, one could claim that it 
is something to do with the context of the object—a blue shirt underneath the orange of a 
streetlamp for example, looks to be black. Indeed, Shoemaker (2000) does go some way to 
explaining why I perceive this property consistently, rather than that property: the 
phenomenal character of an object is, in essence, the disposition to produce an experience 
of a particular quality in an agent with a visual system conducive to experiencing that 
particular quality under normal lighting conditions. This answers the two questions above, 
but it also encounters some of its own difficulties.  
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Firstly, and most obviously, one can ask ‘what are normal lighting conditions?’ The notion 
of ‘normal’ lighting conditions is clearly population-relative: our Scandinavian friends 
experience near constant darkness in the winter, we here in Britain experience dreary 
weather more often than not and our African friends live under the harsh blaze of the sun. 
Clearly, each scenario entails a different normal and whilst the subjectivity inherent to 
‘normalness’, in my opinion, lends itself well to something as subjective and fluid as 
human perception, there will be those that are loath to include a notion so vulnerable to 
fluctuation in an explanation of visual consistency.  
 
Secondly, one can use inversion to posit a situation that demonstrates these criteria false. 
Inversion does not have any bearing on the colours that an agent can perceive; it is just so 
that colour experiences are mismatched. An inverted agent can still see both red and green, 
just not in the same circumstances. Say then, an inverted agent and a standard agent look 
upon the same strawberry. Shoemaker’s criteria would claim that the perceived character is 
due to the strawberry’s disposition to prompt the character in an agent capable of 
perceiving the character, whilst in certain lighting conditions. Well, both agents have a 
physiology capable of perceiving red and green, and both are in the same lighting 
conditions so it would follow that the two agents would have the same experience (i.e, that 
they would both pick out the same feature of the strawberry) yet this is not so (Tye, 2000. 
p.102). One sees the strawberry as green, the other red. It seems then that Shoemaker’s 
criteria for the reliability perceptual character are conceptually unsound and thus, his 
theory must be disregarded until sufficient criteria can be set.  
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2.4.7 TYE AND INVERSION 
 
As Tye was so keen to highlight the flaws of Shoemaker’s theory, it seems only fair to see 
if his method of neutralising inversion fares any better. Allow me to ensure the inversion 
scenario is fresh in one’s mind: an agent is inverted if an objectively red object is 
experienced with a phenomenally green quality, for example. This presents a problem to 
Tye because representational theories of mind claim that the quality of an experience is set 
by the object that is represented—a single object cannot prompt two mutually-exclusive 
phenomenal experiences without violating the principle of non-contradiction. Tye (1994: 
2000, p.105) tries to deal with this problem through the assertion that the inverted agent is 
merely misrepresenting the object—the state that the inverted agent enters when they are 
presented with an objectively red object is the same state that a normal agent would enter 
when presented with an objectively green object; “What determines [the introspective 
quality of an experience] is internal physical constitution … the [objectively red object] 
can look green to [an inverted agent] so long as his brain is not in the same physical state 
as [a standard agent]” (Tye, 1994. p.171).  
 
Tye’s assertion that an inverted agent is simply misrepresenting an object is troubling. If 
we are to agree that an inverted agent can experience an object differently from his 
standard peers by virtue of a different brain-state, it seems that the quality of an experience 
is not ‘about’ the object any longer—it is ‘about’ (at least partially) our brain-states. But if 
this is accepted, it means that we run into Shoemaker’s Projectivism—if qualities can be 
misrepresented through the presence of ‘incorrect’ brain-states then the objects in our 
world are not objectively coloured. To defend Tye is to be forced into accepting some 
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degree of colour irrealism—a notion which Tye seems untroubled by—“colour irrealism 
… is surely a conceptual possibility [and] … it may well be the most commonly held view 
among colour scientists” (Tye, 2000. p.106). But if one is to endorse colour irrealism it 
means that we are constantly misrepresenting objects (as per Shoemaker’s Projectivism) 
because objects—phenomenologically speaking—undoubtedly seem properly ‘coloured’. 
It is here where Tye’s theory becomes unsalvageable. If we are constantly misrepresenting 
objects as coloured, it is a complete nonsense to assert that a subsection of these 
misrepresentations are not misrepresentations at all and instead correctly represent the 
objects of the world—it seems as though Tye has painted himself into a corner, and if he 
wishes to get out, he must drop his defence against inversion.  
 
As Tye’s defence against inversion is untenable, it follows that his representational theory 
of mind must be disregarded until it can properly defend itself against the concept of 
inversion; until then, it joins the good company of Functionalism and Shoemaker’s 
Representationalism as theories of mind toppled by the possibility of inversion. 
 
2.5 ON INVERSION AND ITS DESTRUCTIVENESS 
 
As before, it seems wise to look back upon what has been achieved so far. In this chapter 
we have clarified just what is meant by inversion. The feasibility of such scenarios was 
then evaluated: if they are not feasible, investigation into their effects is useful only for 
vanity. It was noted that instances of inversion are undetectable behaviourally. This means 
that an inverted agent is not deterred from buying tomatoes thinking them unripe nor will 
they trip up in conversation—they still call tomatoes red. It is this behavioural continuity 
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between standard agents and their inverted counterparts that lends inversion much of its 
credibility.  
 
There are those though, that claim that inversion is not actual. Most significant of these is 
C.L. Hardin (1987) who claims that inversion is impossible due to the asymmetries of the 
human colour space. His claim is that different chromatic (coloured) quale carry with them 
non-chromatic qualities—i.e., red is often reported as ‘warm’ as blue is ‘cold’—and thus 
they cannot be properly inverted without entailing nonsense concepts such as ‘hot blue’. 
This was shown to be false by Joseph Levine (1991) who claims that phenomenal 
experiences are atomistic—one can separate the warm from red and attach it to other 
chromatic quale—thus meaning that Hardin’s objection to the feasibility was defeated.  
 
A second argument for the feasibility of inversion was given for those not convinced by 
Levine’s phenomenal atomism: even if it may be so that human colour space cannot be 
inverted to due non-chromatic asymmetries, this does not exclude the possibility that there 
exists a creature with a colour space conducive to inversion (Shoemaker, 1982). So long as 
one cannot exclude the possibility of such a creature, inversion remains feasible.  
 
With inversion shown feasible, we begin to look at the damage it does. We begin by 
looking at Functionalism. A definition of Functionalism was given: the view that mental 
states are identifiable and definable by their functional role. A distinction was made 
between the Brain State Functionalism of Armstrong (1970) and Lewis (1969) which, in 
essence, is a kind of Identity Theory, and the “Scientific Functionalism’ of Hilary Putnam 
(1967) which simply claims that all mental states are definable in functional terms.  
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Inversion was then introduced to Functionalism to demonstrate that the Functionalism is 
indeed an incomplete theory of mind—one can provide a functionally identical account of 
qualitatively different states and because a difference in felt quality entails a difference in 
mental state, it follows that there must be more to phenomenal consciousness then its 
functional relations (Fodor, 1981). 
 
With Functionalism discarded due to its incompleteness, we turn our attention to 
representational theories of consciousness. We begin by showing that representational 
theories of mind use intentionality as a method to identify mentality—if a state has 
intentional content (in other words, if it is ‘about’ something), it is mental (Brentano, 1874. 
p.68). We then look at how Tye (1995, p.137–144: 2000, p.60–64) utilises this to 
formulate a notion of phenomenal consciousness i.e., that phenomenal conscious states are 
those that have Poised, Abstract, Non-conceptual Intentional Content (PANIC). 
 
Following the establishment of a working definition of Representational Phenomenal 
Consciousness, we demonstrated that by asserting that Phenomenal experiences are 
intentional the Representationalists have difficulty in accounting for inversion scenarios—
the possibility of inversion entails that objects must simultaneously be both X (where X is 
an experience referred to by a colour term) and not X. Sydney Shoemaker (1994: 2000) 
attempts to soothe these tensions by providing a framework where this is possible. An 
object can be both red and green, for example, because the redness and greenness pick out 
two different physical properties of the object—these properties are termed Phenomenal 
Properties. It was then shown how the positing of these properties is problematic. Firstly, if 
one claims that for each colour experience there is a related phenomenal property, it 
follows that all objects must have an infinite amount of phenomenal properties as one can 
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always ‘split the difference’ between two colours. Secondly, it was demonstrated that 
Shoemaker could not account for the seeming reliability of phenomenal experiences, i.e., 
why we see this property reliably rather than that property, by appealing again to inversion 
scenarios.  
 
Finally, we looked at Tye’s own responses to the prospect of inversion—that inverted 
agents are simply those that are in a state that misrepresents the object in question (1994: 
2000, p.105) before dismissing this because it entails colour irrealism which ultimately 
acts to make Tye’s position incoherent.  
 
We have demonstrated that inversion defeats both Functionalism and Representationalism. 
If we are to nullify disruptive capacities of inversion, another theory is necessary. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
INVERSION, THE INVERTIBLE METAPHYSIC AND PRACTICALITY: AN 
ALTERNATIVE TO THE TRADITIONAL SYSTEM 
 
3.1 AN ALTERNATIVE 
 
Our last section demonstrated the difficulties that arise when one shines the revealing light 
of spectral inversion over the two dominant theories of mind. It seems therefore sensible to 
dismiss these theories and ponder an alternative—in this section we begin to explore a 
conception of experience that breaks with those found within Functionalism and 
Representationalism. The work done in this section is introductory—it sets forth the 
philosophical understanding and theoretical background that our reformulation of 
experience requires. To begin this work though, we need to isolate and evaluate just what it 
is that makes inversion so problematic. 
 
3.2 FOUNDATIONAL INSTABILITIES 
 
The notion of inversion, as we have demonstrated, renders the theories of Functionalism 
and Representationalism untenable. So far as inversion scenarios are plausible, the two 
theories cannot stand. There are two mechanisms through which this can occur. The first is 
that inversion scenarios attack Functionalism and Representationalism independently. In 
this case, inversion attacks something unique about each theory which then renders that 
theory unattractive. The second mechanism is that inversion attacks the theories in tandem, 
i.e., there is a shared element of their theoretical dependencies and it is this that Inversion 
acts to undermine. In this case, inversion does not attack the theories as separate entities, 
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but instead attacks the foundations upon which the theories are built. Due to the destructive 
efficiency of inversion scenarios, it seems as though this second mechanism is the correct 
one. A weakness has been drawn up into the theories and now manifests itself as an 
Achilles’ heel, a weakness ready to be exploited. If we are to render inversion 
philosophically unproblematic, we should identify this weakness and act to cut it out of our 
thinking.  
 
3.2.1 INVERSION, AGAIN 
 
The best way to identify the weakness that inversion exploits is to cast a fresh eye upon 
inversion. The mechanics of inversion should be familiar by now. If Alice and Belle look 
upon the same ripe strawberry and it causes a red phenomenal experience in Alice and a 
green phenomenal experience in Belle, Belle can be said to be inverted. From this, we can 
peel back the mask on inversion: it is a variant of scepticism. If there is a strawberry, 
which is objectively red, and it causes a green experience in Belle, one would be entirely 
justified in extrapolating this notion and applying it broadly to cast doubt upon the 
reliability of our experiences. Put bluntly, inversion appears only to be a suitably dressed-
up version of the archetypical sceptical question: “are things really as they appear to me?” 
 
If one looks closely, the mechanics of inversion offer insight into the metaphysical 
structure needed to facilitate inversion (and indeed, other varieties of scepticism). Through 
examining the scenario, we can ascertain the criteria that must be met for Inversion to 
work: 
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1. Inversion needs an external world, full of objects that have a particular 
nature, which exists independently from any observer. If a strawberry hidden in 
the depths of an overgrown English garden does not have the same ontological 
status as a strawberry displayed proudly atop a pavlova, and hence there is no 
invariant external type ‘strawberry’ (for example), then inversion cannot operate. 
There must be a way-things-are in the world, because if there were not it is 
nonsense to call Belle’s experience inverted—for something to be inverted a 
standard frame of reference is necessary. It is this that the objective world provides. 
  
2.  A private mental realm, full of experiential data is also necessary. Belle’s 
green qualia must exist, supported by some substance (either immaterial or material 
depending on your preferences) and this realm must be private to ensure that the 
inversions are not explicitly manifest. 
 
3. A distance between the objective world of objects and the subjective mental 
realm is required for inversion to occur. The two realms need to be somewhat 
independent from each other because if they were not so, the doubt that inversion 
leverages would cease to exist—doubt creeps in through distance.  
 
It is quite plausible to see how Functionalism and Representationalism can be transposed 
onto the structure exposed by the above criteria—in fact, the raison d'être of the two 
theories is to try and solve the difficulties they present. Take Functionalism for instance—
by giving us the tools with which we can identify mental states and understand their 
purpose within the objective world, it is clear that Functionalists are using their theory to 
erect a conduit between the two realms endorsed by our criteria. By ‘rebranding’ the 
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traditionally subjective mental states as a subtype of objective functional states, 
Functionalism seeks to sooth the tensions between the two realms simply by asserting that 
the kind of thinking we use to understand the objective world is also appropriate for mental 
states—thereby attempting to collapse the distance between the two realms by asserting 
that, through Functionalism, we come to be in possession of the conceptual toolkit needed 
to understand our mentality. A very similar process happens within Representationalism—
it is just so that the theory attempts to breach the two realms using intentional content 
rather than Functional states. By bringing elements of the world ‘into’ the mental realm via 
intentional content, Representationalism also seems to try and strip mentality of its 
subjectivity and fluidity in an attempt to convince its sympathisers that we can understand 
mentality in the same way as we can the objective world. If the objective world can 
somehow puncture the mental realm through intentional content, then it follows that the 
distance between the two realms is eradicated. But, as inversion highlights, to collapse the 
two realms in on each other by stripping the mental realm of its subjectivity—i.e., to make 
it understandable in objective terms with either a Functionalist or Representationalist 
slant—is doomed to failure. To make the mental objective is oxymoronic—the mental is 
subjective and anywhere this is denied, inversion can enter to demonstrate the error. 
It seems therefore, if we are to neutralise the destructive potency of inversion, we must 
find another method of closing the distance between these two realms whilst respecting the 
subjectivity of mentality. 
 
3.2.2 THE ORIGINS OF THE DISTANCE 
 
If we are to close up the dichotomy between the realms and thus wipe away the 
metaphysical picture that lends inversion its destructive potency, it is prudent to be aware 
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of its genesis. Of course, it does not appear to be too contentious to claim that a metaphysic 
which is so intertwined with scepticism is likely born from scepticism itself; the creation of 
anything will always bear the marks of the tools used to make it. As such, it is appropriate 
that the origin of this metaphysical picture is found within Descartes’ work—inversion 
bears the hallmarks of Descartes’ radical scepticism. The conceptual space between 
Inversion and Descartes’ characteristic claim that “the senses deceive, and it is prudent 
never to trust completely those who have deceived us even once” (1641. p.12) is so slight 
that one can be forgiven for thinking there is no space there at all. To begin our exploration 
into the genesis of what I shall term the Invertible Metaphysic—the metaphysical system 
characterised by the existence of a dichotomy and distance between an objective world and 
a mental realm—we should look at Descartes’ methodical application of scepticism for it is 
precisely this that provides the foundations for inversion. Locke, the first to articulate the 
notion of inversion, belonged to the generation of Philosophers who directly succeeded 
Descartes, so naturally, his thinking was heavily influenced by the work of his predecessor.  
 
Descartes’s methodical application of scepticism to the phenomena of the world was not 
without motivation. Descartes, by devoting himself to the “general demolition of [his] 
opinions” (ibid.) wished to identify a solid foundation upon which the sciences could be 
built in order to ensure their stability and longevity—he wished to isolate an indubitable 
notion through the application of radical doubt to serve as this foundation. Such 
‘demolition of opinion’ involved rejecting all that “[one] acquire[s] either from the senses 
or through the senses … [as] from time to time [it had been] found that the senses deceive” 
(ibid.) and thus such sensory information alone cannot provide a sufficiently stable 
foundation upon which to base the sciences. It is not difficult to supply anecdotal evidence 
to substantiate Descartes’ claim that our senses may deceive us—one only needs to think 
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of Plato’s ubiquitous example of a stick appearing disjointed when half submerged in a 
clear body of water in order to corroborate Descartes’ rationale—and thus this notion 
enjoys some intuitive plausibility. This process of applying radical doubt leads eventually 
to the identification of Descartes’ famous cogito, the indubitable truth that serves as the 
foundation of his epistemology: Cogito Ergo Sum or, I think therefore I exist (Descartes, 
1637. p.127). The sceptical robustness of the cogito is clear: thought cannot exist 
independently from a thinking agent, in much the same manner as running cannot exist 
without a something that runs. To doubt the cogito is to prove it correct, since to doubt is 
to think, and thus, it is impervious to doubt.  
 
The robustness of the cogito may serve as a useful base for an epistemology, but it has 
consequences that reach beyond providing a justification for worldly inquiry—its 
indubitable nature entails the existence of a ‘thinking thing’, namely, the Cartesian Ego—
the entity capable of thought. The mental substance of the Cartesian Ego can be contrasted 
with substance that is manifest within the objects of the world. It makes little sense to 
claim this other substance is also res cogitans, for res cogitans is immanent—it is intrinsic 
to, and thus exclusive to, the mental realm—and thus impossible to doubt; whereas the 
objects of the world are vulnerable to doubt. Another substance must support them: the res 
extensa, or physical substance. It is doubt that motivates Descartes’ distinction between 
these two substances—the “thinking thing and [the] corporeal thing” (Descartes, 1644. 
p.195). Through this systematic application of doubt, Descartes carves the world into two 
spheres. In one sphere, we have the objective worldly objects—Alice and Belle’s 
strawberry—and in the other sphere we have our mental lives, our thoughts, our 
experiences, our beliefs and so on—Alice and Belle’s phenomenally dissimilar experiences 
belong to this realm.  
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It would seem that two of the three criteria that inversion requires to operate have been 
met. Descartes’ doubt gives us two worlds: an objective physical one and a mental one. All 
that remains now is to demonstrate that there is a distance between the two. The traditional 
assumption—and indeed the one made by Descartes himself—is that this distance is 
causal: if “the mind is completely different from the body” (Descartes, 1641. p.59) by 
virtue of the differences in their supporting substances, it is not at all clear how the two 
could interact with each other (Gassendi in Descartes, 1641. pp.233–240). Two res extensa 
entities can interact with each other—a falling book may knock a glass of water over—and 
two res cogitans entities may interact—one thought may cause another thought—but it 
does not seem one can swap and change between the two. To posit a causal relation 
between the two is problematic. Of course, Descartes did offer a mechanic via which the 
two could interact, the pineal gland—the “principle seat [of the rational soul]” (1662. 
p.102)—but this does not achieve anything other than prompting the reformulated question 
“how does the pineal gland operate?”. Indeed, one may seek to close this distance between 
the two spheres by arguing that the Cartesian Ego is actually constituted from res extensa. 
This is the path physicalist Philosophers, including Functionalists (at least those whom are 
committed to physical instantiation of functionalist states) and Representationalists have 
taken and it is a fruitful one. If the objective world and the physical world are both res 
extensa entities, their interaction is now feasible and the distance supposedly stipulated by 
the Invertible Metaphysic is gone. But this is not so. As we have previous demonstrated, 
theories that take the step of “materialising” the mental are still vulnerable to inversion, so 
it makes sense that the distance that inversion scenarios leverage is not causal in nature as 
inversion has efficacy even in scenarios where mental-physical interaction is feasible. 
Another kind of distance must be relevant. 
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The distance relevant to our dismissal is that which is articulated by the notion of 
interiority and exteriority, or immanence and transcendence. These terms mean little on 
their own, so it is prudent to clarify them. The immanent, or the interior ‘is traditionally 
conceived as the sphere of … conscious life’ (Dillon, 1997. p.36) and this is to be 
contrasted with the transcendent, or the exterior: “the universe of things existing in 
themselves … independent of consciousness” (ibid.). As one can see, the immanent and 
the transcendent refer, respectively, to the mental realm (i.e., the Cartesian Ego) and the 
objective world required by the Invertible Metaphysic. Now, to highlight the distance 
between the two, we must not lose sight of the fact that their postulation is intimately 
related to Cartesian Epistemology—we must enquire after the nature of knowledge in the 
Cartesian System to properly elucidate the distance. Allow us to return to Descartes’ 
indefeasible modicum of knowledge—the cogito. Descartes’ rationale for assenting to the 
cogito is that it expresses a notion “very clearly and distinctly [perceived] as true” 
(Descartes, 1641. p.24); the robustness of the cogito is reliant primarily on the notion that 
all which cannot be ably doubted inherently expresses a truth. This naturally prompts 
questions on how the cogito acquires its epistemic tenacity—just how is it that we come to 
perceive the cogito with clarity and distinctness? One has to look again at the cogito. When 
expressed in its translated subject/predicate form—I think therefore I am—it becomes clear 
that the cogito is, in essence, the expression of a belief about the existence of a being that 
is capable of believing—a thinking being. This means that the materials needed to 
ascertain the clarity of the cogito are brought into light by the cogito itself—the clarity of a 
perception (in the Cartesian sense) is essentially a comment about its veracity and the 
veracity of a perception is only ascertainable if one can verify it against something, and 
because all ideas are mental, all ideas about one’s own mental states are intrinsically 
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indubitable because the materials needed to ensure their veracity are naturally present. This 
notion also explains why we can always doubt the veracity of the beliefs we hold about the 
external world. If it is so that for a perception to be ‘clear and distinct’ it must be veridical 
and the only way one can ascertain the veracity of a belief is through verification, the fact 
that we can always doubt our senses interferes with the process of supplying the evidence 
against which we can check our beliefs. For instance, to borrow an example from the 
Meditations, our perceptions of the sun seem to justify the belief that the sun is rather 
small, whereas astronomical inquiry suggests it is several magnitudes larger, but neither of 
these doubts about the nature of the sun has any impact upon the truth of one’s belief that 
the experience of the sun exists, because the evidence required to verify it is readily 
available. Only beliefs that concern the immanent mental sphere can be verified with 
certainty, because the process of verification needed to ascertain the truth of beliefs about 
the external world is vulnerable to scepticism owing to the unreliability of our senses4. 
Here lies the ‘distance’ necessary for the Invertible Metaphysic—the distance is epistemic 
and for as long as the dichotomy between interior and exterior stands, and a convincing 
theory remains absent, scepticism remains an important issue in Philosophy.  
 
3.3 REPAIR 
 
Our ultimate goal is now clear: if we are to deflate the significance of the scepticism 
expressed by inversion, we must provide a convincing theory to guard against it. But first, 
some ‘housework’ is necessary, if we are to be successful we should capitalise upon the 
failures of the Invertible Metaphysic in order to sculpt a system where the damage caused 
																																																						
4 This may not necessarily be true—if one posits a guarantor for the veracity of sensory experience, as 
Descartes does through his inclusion of God into his metaphysic, this problem does not arise. But, due to the 
fact that one should be always be weary of adding unnecessary baggage to our ontological commitments, it is 
understandable why this route may be unconvincing.  
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by inversion scenarios is minimised. Let us return to traditional epistemological 
methodology. It has long been held, and indeed still is so by scientific disciplines, that 
truth about the world can only come to be known if one can, in essence, ‘remove-the-
human’ from the situation. Knowledge is the product of a reliable and justified move from 
first person experiences to third person objectivity—i.e., when all subjectivity and human 
biases have been removed or when ‘I see trees’ has reliably morphed into ‘trees can be 
seen’, it can be said that a truth about the world has been ascertained. This view, that a 
manner of anti-human detachment is a desideratum for knowledge, is the view that has 
been traditionally espoused by philosophy (Dreyfus, 1991. p.45). This process of 
detachment finds its keenest articulation within Descartes’ methodical application of 
radical doubt. The dogmatic belief that truth is only the product of disinterested and 
detached processes may do justice to the physical objects of the external world as 
illustrated by the achievements of Engineering, Science and the like, but it also engenders 
a peculiar view of humanity. It leads us to believe that we can treat ourselves in the same 
detached manner and by viewing ourselves with this detached ‘god’s-eye’ perspective, we 
come to misrepresent the nature of humanity. We begin to see ourselves as the only subject 
and humanity, as a collective, as a kind of object acted on by the world, unable to properly 
act for itself. But this is wrong; “[a] person is not a thing, not a substance, not an object” 
(Heidegger, 1927. p.47). Humanity and humans are not a what, they are a who, and 
ignoring this distinction entails a number of problematic issues.  
 
To properly appreciate the significance of these issues, a discussion about the meaning of 
the term ‘world’ is necessary. Without proper grasp of the term, these issues lack adequate 
potency. The term ‘world’ has multiple different referents that should be explored. The 
first sense of the term is the one most commonly attributed to it by both the layperson and 
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the philosopher—the world is nothing more than the collective “totality of beings … 
objectively present within the world” (ibid., p.64). It is this ‘world’ that is traditionally 
engaged with by philosophy. Intimately related to this sense is the second sense of the 
term—in this sense, ‘world’ refers not to the totality of objective beings, but a totality of 
objective beings; a subsection of the totality bound together by the subjective reference of 
an agent. To make better sense of this, it is best to consider an example: when a stamp-
collector talks of the world of stamp-collecting, or when a motorsport enthusiast talks of 
the world of motorsport, they are employing this sense of ‘world’. The first sense of the 
term contains within it a nod toward its third sense—the claim that the world is the 
“totality of beings … objectively present within the world” (ibid., emphasis added) clearly 
needs some unpacking—if the world is the totality of beings, just what world are they 
objectively present within? The meaning of ‘world’ in this context is best thought of as an 
arena of experience, the aggregate collection of opportunities for deliberate action and self-
expression presented to us by the totality of objective entities. Clearly, this sense of 
‘world’ is complex. It is possible to distinguish between collective arenas of experience 
and personal arenas of experience (ibid., p. 65). One may ‘possess’ a personal arena of 
experience—an arena that encompasses the totality of the possible opportunities of action 
and expression available to you—that is distinct from your neighbour’s, but there may be 
opportunities available to both of you that constitute part of “the “public” world of the we” 
(ibid., p.65), i.e., a capacity for action or expression that features in both of your ‘worlds’. 
You may find particular objects to be of significance, your neighbour may find other 
objects to be of significance and thus in this way you would occupy different worlds—the 
objects that share the same significance to both yourself and your neighbour unite you 
together in the world of ‘we’. An example may be of value: you may be a fisherman and 
your neighbour a woodworker. Your fishing pole does not have the same significance to 
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your neighbour as it does to you and the same applies inversely to your neighbour’s lathe. 
But let us say you were both Christian—the village church would share the same 
significance to both of you so it sits within your shared world. It is these networks of 
significance to which the third sense of the term ‘world’ refers. How objects gain their 
significance will be explored in depth later. The fourth and final sense of the term ‘world’ 
refers to “structural totality of particular “worlds,” but contains in itself the a priori of 
worldliness in general” (ibid., p.65). It is best to think of this sense as referring to the 
aggregate totality of the individual personal and collective worlds from the senses prior—it 
is the overarching ‘total’ that allows us to understand the particular worlds it encompasses. 
The important senses, for our purposes, are the first sense and the third sense—the sense of 
world as the totality of object and the sense of world as the arena of experience and 
significance. The importance of this distinction shall be shown in the following pages.  
 
The fundamental issue that arises from treating humanity as a kind of object—of analysing 
humanity as one would analyse the objects of the world—is that by doing so, we 
completely misinterpret our proper relationship with the world. There are few that would 
be enthusiastic in endorsing the notion that humans live in a world that is not populated by 
physical objects. In fact, so pervasive is this Materialism that to suggest otherwise to those 
outside of Idealist circles borders upon the absurd; Materialism has become an invisible 
frame to our existence. Because of this, though, it is not often that our relationship with 
these objects is examined—it eludes examination by virtue of its acceptance—but this does 
not mean that it should not be examined. Yes, we live a life amongst a collection of 
physical objects, but just what does this mean? What does it mean to be in the world? If 
one thinks of the world as the totality of objective beings and takes the detached ‘god’s-
eye’ perspective that supports the Invertible Metaphysic the answer is clear: we are in the 
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world in the same manner “as water is ‘in’ the glass [or] the dress is in the closet” (ibid. 
p.54). If the world is the totality of objects and we are worldly, it makes sense to say that 
being in the world is simply a fact about spatiality, proximity and location—humanity just 
happens to be occupying a similar location to the objects of the world and whilst this 
should not be argued against, as we are indeed ‘in the world’ in this sense, we should be 
careful not to reduce our relationship with our world to the same kind of relationship an 
apple may have with a fruit bowl. If we do reduce our relationship with the world in such a 
way, we fail to capture how humanity is properly in the world in two major ways. Firstly, 
as is suggested by the ‘other-worldliness’ of the Cartesian Ego, it makes it seem that our 
relationship with the world is indirect, contingent and severable (Mulhall, 2005. p.40-41). 
To think of our relationship with the world as one based solely upon proximity suggests 
that a human can be removed from the world in the same way that a football can be 
removed from a tree, but this is incorrect. We must realise that we are necessarily worldly 
beings—there is always an “‘in-which’ [where humanity] ‘lives’” (Heidegger, 1927. p.65). 
We are in eternal possession of an experiential arena—we are necessarily embedded 
amongst subjectively significant objects. Even if our spatial relationship with the world is 
damaged, i.e., if we change our location within the world, destroying our proximity with 
our surrounding objects, we do not destroy our relationship with the world as a whole. We 
retain our spaces of experience. We will find ourselves in proximity to new surrounding 
objects and with them we will form new networks of significance—we cannot break our 
link with the world, we can only change it. Even if we could remove an agent from the 
Earth in its entirety they would still inhabit a world (albeit a more barren one) by virtue of 
their existence—simply moving a chess piece to another co-ordinate does not mean that it 
is out of play.  
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In addition to making our relationship with the world seem contingent, thinking of our 
relationship with the world as one of proximity alone makes us misunderstand its nature. 
The true way that humans are ‘in the world’ builds upon this notion of proximity and is 
best captured by casting our eye briefly to semantics—it can be articulated through 
distinguishing between two senses of the word ‘in’ (Dreyfus, 1991. p.42–45). The first 
sense we should be familiar with: it is ‘in’ as a preposition and refers directly to proximity. 
It is the ‘in’ of this sentence: “Brian is in the car”. The second sense is subtler. It is the 
sense articulated by these sentences: “Alison is in love with Brian” and “Julian is in 
trouble”. This second sense refers to the way that a human is involved with entities in the 
world. If this notion is not yet clear, we can also proffer further clarification elsewhere: it 
is not only ‘in’ that captures this notion of involvement. For instance, the word ‘at’ can be 
employed to illustrate the same notion; should one contrast the sentence “Alison is at 
Brian’s house” with the sentence “Misha is at play”, one will find the first sense captures a 
fact about physical location and the second sense captures a fact about what an agent is 
doing, or, more broadly, how they are involved in the world. It is through this that we 
highlight a distinction which is lost when viewing humanity through the detached ‘god’s-
eye’—two objects cannot be involved with each other in this sense. An object cannot 
establish another object as a node in its network of significance; a teacup cannot long for 
its contents nor can an apple find itself absorbed in its work. We humans become involved 
with the objects of the world and we imbue them with importance: we become “occupied 
with things” (ibid. p.43). We take up relations to the objects in our presence (Heidegger, 
1927. p.54–55)—we do not encounter the objects of the world as meaningless passive 
entities, as two objects would encounter each other, we instead encounter things as 
meaningful, as useful, as available for use, and we come to “understand ourselves and our 
existence by way of the activities we pursue and the things we take care of” (Heidegger, 
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cited in Dreyfus, 1991. p.61). We do not see a mug as a shaped piece of fire hardened 
clay—we see our mug, emblazoned with the pattern that appeals to our aesthetic which we 
use to drink our coffee. To view humanity though a detached gaze, as traditional inquiry 
encourages us to do, is to miss what it is that make us unique: the fact that we breathe 
meaning into our worlds via our involvement with its objects. 
 
3.3.1 ON INVOLVEMENT 
 
There are those who are loyal to the metaphysical picture created by Descartes that would 
be keen to argue that there may be a manner in which our involvement (i.e., the process of 
attributing meaning to the objects of the world, so that we come to care about them) can be 
accounted for in Cartesian terms. The best account of such is found within Husserl’s 
Cartesian Meditations (1931). Imagine one is in a room, and in that room there sits a small 
desk and upon that desk sits an unfamiliar object; a die. One then walks in small circles 
around the desk, observing the die from all angles. The object before oneself, the die, at 
this point is meaningless—or more accurately, we have no meaningful relationship with it. 
It is simply the content of a series of visual experiences and thus involvement with the die 
at this stage is thought impossible due to its meaninglessness—in much the same way as an 
isolated, pure red sensation does not give up its meaning unless it is taken alongside other 
theory, the simple perception of the die is not sufficient grounds for human involvement. 
Meaning has to be given to the die following a mental process: the information carried by 
these visual experiences must be ‘stitched’ together via the process of “synthesis, a mode 
of combination exclusively peculiar to consciousness” (Husserl, 1931. p.39). Once this 
synthesis has occurred, one comes to see the die as a solid object and thus the die is 
transformed from the content of a number of visual images into an object ready to facilitate 
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games of chance. It is at this point, once the synthesis has been completed, that our 
involvement with the world becomes possible. Under this model, “theory is prior to 
practice’ (Dreyfus, 1991. p.47), i.e., our involvement with our world necessarily involves 
mental processes.   
 
This view, whilst providing a fairly amicable account of human worldly involvement using 
Cartesian mechanics, is flawed. Let us look at what it is that synthesis is and does: it is the 
intake of experiential data which is then manipulated, mentally, to provide the justification 
for a belief, which is then used to inform our involvements with the world. To transpose 
this into the terms of Husserl’s example: the experiential slices of information are used to 
justify the belief that the die is solid and this is then used to justify the notion that it may be 
used to play games of chance. There is a necessary mental element to this process and this 
mental process effectively equips an agent with an interior, immanent belief—e.g., that the 
die is solid—that cannot be demonstrated to be consistent with the exterior, transcendent 
world. The epistemic gap of the Invertible Metaphysic has again allowed scepticism to 
flourish and thus, to assert that mental processes are somehow prior to our practical 
engagements with the world is to cloak our actions in an impenetrable uncertainty—how 
can we know that our belief that the die is solid is correct?—and thus we become 
paralysed, unable to act with confidence, at the mercy of our unreliable sensory 
information. Indeed, this notion was recognised by Husserl and we can speculate that his 
Idealism is an attempt to deal with this problem. Yet, the undesirability of a case 
vulnerable to scepticism is clear, but thankfully, Husserl’s example contains within it the 
materials necessary to build its successor: a model where mental processes, such as 
synthesis, are not necessary for human interaction with the world.  
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The motivations of finding such a theory are clear—if there is a way that we can 
demonstrate that there is a method of engaging with the world that does not directly rely on 
mental processes such as synthesis, explicit propositional beliefs or anything similar, it 
follows that this method of engaging with the world would not need the characteristic 
interior/exterior, immanent/transcendent distinction of the Invertible Metaphysic and thus, 
the damage that inversion and its sceptical kin causes would cease to be of any 
philosophical concern. If there is an alternative method of explaining our relationship with 
the world and the way that we attribute meaning to worldly objects, that does not insist that 
‘theory precedes practice’, it does not matter if scepticism interferes with any theorising 
processes, because we have the alternative system to fall back on. We are no longer 
playing an ‘all or nothing’ game and positions of radical scepticism, such as solipsism, lose 
any persuasiveness they may have had.  
 
As has been suggested, it seems as though Husserl’s die example contains the materials 
needed to take the first steps into our practical theory of involvement. It is undeniable that 
when Husserl circles the desk, receiving the sensory information poised to be synthesised, 
his actions are an example of the kind of detached observation we spoke of earlier. But 
what is detached observation if not a way in which humanity involves itself with the 
objects of the world? It does not seem too bold to suggest that Husserl, when circling the 
die observing its faces, was in some manner “taken in by the world” (Heidegger, 1927. 
p.61) and absorbed in the task of observation, in much the same manner that a painter may 
be absorbed in the task of capturing the likeness of the model before him. As such, it 
makes sense to view both detached observation and practical action as two aspects of the 
same phenomena: the human process of attributing meaning to the objects of the world via 
our involvement with them. Granted, it makes little sense to argue that the detached 
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observation of an object is akin to the practical manipulation of an object, but this does not 
mean that they are necessarily unrelated phenomena. In much the same way that one can 
argue that darkness is a mode of lightness—specifically its absence—it is possible to argue 
that detached observation is simply a mode of involvement: on one hand you have the 
mode of involvement concerning practical manipulation, typified by sculptors sculpting, 
musicians playing and the like, and on the other hand, you have the mode of involvement 
“refraining from every manipulation and use” (ibid., p.61) typified by detached 
observation. When viewed this way, it becomes clear that the claim that ‘theory precedes 
practice’ is not necessarily true; Husserl’s steps around the die, his observation of the die 
and, arguably, even the synthesis of the visual data itself, are all examples of theory 
emerging from a fundamental involvement with the objects of the world—an involvement 
that is based primarily upon action, not Cartesian detached theorisation.  
 
3.3.2 PRACTICAL MEANING GIVING 
 
To explain this action-orientated involvement which typifies humanity’s basic relationship 
with the world, it seems wise to review Husserl’s die example and shape our theory from 
its errors. Imagine that you are the agent in Husserl’s example—you enter a room and 
there, on a desk, lies a die. Husserl’s theory entails that the die before you is useless and 
without meaning until one has synthesised its visual aspects together and deduced its 
solidity and its ability to facilitate play. This seems strange. It does not seem to be the 
method through which we usually ascertain the solidity, the physicality, of an object of this 
kind. Does it not seem much more plausible that when confronted with a die for the first 
time, one would not duck and weave around it but would instead come to know the 
object’s solidity simply by taking it up into one’s hand? It does not seem that we come to 
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understand the solidity of the die through “perceptual cognition, but, rather [through] 
handling, using and taking care of things” (ibid., p.67). Such a notion is so natural that it is 
invisible. Any number of mundane instances—from shopping at a supermarket to making 
oneself a cup of tea—can be employed to demonstrate how we come to identify the 
contents of our perceptions as physical objects of the world via practical manipulation. At 
no point did we ever have to deduce that a mug is solid through detached examination—we 
have always had the option to simply take it into our hands to find this out. 
 
It is here where radical scepticism—the noxious kind that supports extreme sceptical 
positions such as solipsism—begins to loosen its stranglehold. If we say that we come to 
know the physical existence of objects through physically manipulating them in one way 
or another, it follows that we can no longer justifiably doubt their existence. The 
justification for their existence is no longer mental—we do not know that the clutter on our 
desks is present because of some mental representation of it, but rather because we have 
likely placed it there ourselves. It is our interactions with objects that provide the evidence 
for their existence, not an internal representation of them. So it seems, for the brute 
purpose of guaranteeing the existence of the objects of the world, physical manipulation is 
sufficient—thus transforming this kind of knowledge from a type of internal state, into an 
external human activity (Mulhall, 2005. p.44ff). There are those though, that would offer 
an objection to this manner of dispelling radical scepticism by way of it being replicable by 
unconscious entities such as robots. It seems that if there were no mental representations 
underlying the physical interactions, they would not be dissimilar to those of a piece of 
machinery. This is an interesting train of thought, but it is not one that derails our project. 
Human (i.e., conscious) interaction is dissimilar from robot (unconscious) interaction to 
such an extent that to properly understand them is to render them incomparable. Luckily, 
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the difference between the two can be summarised briefly by paraphrasing John 
Hagueland’s pithy statement: robots don’t give a damn (Haugeland, 1979).  
 
This is best elaborated upon through an example, let us look at manufacturing. It is an act 
that originated as a conscious involvement with the world, that has recently become 
appropriated by unconscious entities, so comparison seems readily available until one pays 
attention to the purpose of the involvement. In both cases, the eventual assembly of a 
product is undoubtedly the primary purpose, but it is the secondary purpose that shows us 
the distinction. The human creates a product to take a stand on itself (or to acquire the 
capital needed to take a stand on itself)—the secondary purpose of manufacturing for the 
human is to (ultimately) express oneself. The unconscious being lacks this purpose and 
acts with no expressive purposes in mind. This disinterestedness is the basic mode of being 
with robotic actors—yes, it may be able to ascertain the existence of worldly objects in the 
same manner as a human (maybe a sensor could confirm the presence of an item in a 
robotic hand, for instance) but the robot does not even have capacity to recognise these 
objects as things. They can only recognise their presence, and even that is in a cold brute 
fashion. There is no such thing as purpose to an unconscious robotic being. If one is to 
swap the materials that the robot uses, the robot does not pay attention to this—it does not 
care if the fixings it uses are fit for purpose or properly decorative. It would just continue 
its pre-programmed processes undeterred. It is only humanity that cares about objects in 
the way it does—only humanity imbues the objects of the world with meaning. 
 
Physical interaction does not merely confirm the existence of a physical object, but it also 
helps us to uncover its meanings. Let us return to the die in Husserl’s example. It is only 
after the die is ascertained to be solid that its meaning comes to be known; it is a tool for 
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playing games. But let us ask the question of how this meaning arises. How do we know 
the object before us is a die and that a die is used to play games? It seems as though the 
detached observation in Husserl’s example could indeed provide this meaning—one could 
see that the die interacted with other physical objects by its resting neatly atop the desk, 
one could see that the size of the die allowed for it to be comfortably taken into the hand 
and one may even go so far as to understand that the item was intended to randomly 
generate numbers through the observation of the markings on its faces. But this is not the 
only method in which one could ascertain this meaning. Does it not seem, as we have said, 
more natural that one could instead pick the die up to ascertain its physicality? And that the 
purpose of the die—as a thing that generates random small integers—can be found out 
through active engagement with the object, i.e., rolling it and observing its behaviours? 
This seems possible. If so, it is of great importance because it seems to suggest that the 
Cartesian hegemony over meaning giving is incorrect—conceptualisation does not 
necessarily precede meaning-giving because there is an alternative method of meaning-
giving: practical engagement (Heidegger, 1927. p.66–72).  
 
One must not lose sight though, of the notion that both observation and engagement are 
modes of involvement—they are both paths in which humanity can become absorbed into 
the world, inhabiting worldly objects and transforming them into a “part of us” (Dreyfus, 
1991. p.45). Practical engagement with objects and theoretical contemplation of them 
achieve the same goal—“in one case we observe and in the other instance we act (op. cit., 
1927. p.69) but in both instances meaning is breathed into the world. It is worldly 
involvement that ultimately brings meaning to worldly objects. This is true but lacking 
important nuance. Both observation and engagement may tell us that the die is used for 
generating random small numbers, but this in itself is largely meaningless. Taken in 
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isolation the generation of random numbers is necessarily meaningless—for one to 
disclose the true meaning of the die it must be viewed against a situation; a practical, goal-
orientated backdrop. It must be combined with other useful objects before its true meaning 
can be discovered: “there “is” no such thing as a useful thing [because to be useful it has to 
exist within] a totality of useful things [in order for] this useful thing [to] be what it is” 
(ibid., 1927, p.68). If our worldly involvement is tasked with establishing a network of 
subjectively significant objects, it is clear why isolated objects are lacking in proper 
meaning—it is from the network that the object draws its proper meaning and one cannot 
have a network with only a single node. To provide an example: our die is not for-playing-
Snakes-and-Ladders unless it is encountered amongst the correct objects—a Snakes-and-
Ladders board and a willing opponent, for instance. Some clarification regarding this 
would not go amiss: when encountering an unfamiliar object, we come to provide that 
object meaning by becoming involved with that object, either through detached 
observation or practical engagement, but always against a backdrop of other objects and 
personal goals. For instance, one may encounter a hammer, see it is physical via 
observation and take it into one’s hand, feel its weight and put it to work in a certain way 
depending on the surrounding objects and one’s goals—we can put the hammer to work as 
a thing-for-driving-nails if we see protruding nails and it is our wish to sink them; or we 
can put it to work as a thing-that-holds-down-papers if we are struggling to keep our 
paperwork still in a particularly blustery workshop—the context in which we encounter an 
object impacts upon the significance we bestow upon it; different contexts prompt us to 
imbue the object with different meanings. 
  
Of course, the process of meaning-giving outlined above is not undergone every time we 
meet an object. We forgo such processes when we recognise the object before us, when we 
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are familiar with its meaning, its “what-for” (op. cit., 1927. p.69). Such a process of 
recognising the practical applications of an object is known as Circumspection—when we 
recognise the set of keys as useful-for-entering-my-house or the watch as useful-for-telling-
the-time, we are said to circumspect the ‘handiness’ of these objects (ibid.). We recognise 
the object as something useful for something. It would be easy to conflate the notion of 
Circumspection with ‘standard’ observation, i.e., the visual perception of worldly objects, 
as it is indubitably a method of Circumspection—we recognise the usefulness of the 
equipment only after we recognise the equipment itself and seeing the equipment is a 
useful method of recognising it. But to conflate the two is incorrect—one can come to 
recognise the handiness of an object in different ways. A blind man, for instance, never 
sees his cane but he will recognise its usefulness for getting around the moment it is placed 
into his hand5 (Merleau-Ponty. 1945. p.144–145). 
 
But as we have said, we do not undergo the process of practical meaning-giving when 
presented with every object—think back to how one acquired the ability to use a door 
handle. It was unlikely to be acquired via your own practical process of meaning-giving or 
through your detached observation of the mechanisms before you (it is most probable that 
one cannot pinpoint how or when one acquired the know-how to use a door handle). It is 
instead, due to the pervasiveness of the object—a day without encountering a door handle 
is unusual—more likely that the handiness of the door handle and the ‘know-how’ 
necessary to capitalise upon it was disclosed through the observation of another agent and 
the subsequent mimicry of that agent’s actions. We see our peers grasp the door handle, 
turn it and walk through the door frame and then we understand its purpose and how to 
																																																						
5 The example of a blind man is a useful one to consider, for his ability to get around in the world illustrates 
the worth of our engaged model of meaning-giving—the blind man cannot know the meaning of the objects 
in the world through synthesis of visual ‘frames’ as he does not have that information available to him. He 
cannot engage in detached visual observation, for he lacks that capacity. He must instead learn to cope in his 
world through physical engagement, practice and, to some extent, trial and error.  
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realise it. One can learn about objects not only by personally assigning meaning to objects, 
but also by observing the meaning that others have assigned to the object and acting in 
according with that meaning (Merleau-Ponty, 1945. p.369–372).  
 
At a young age, we see that our peers have disclosed footballs as for-kicking and ropes as 
for-jumping-over and after we watch their behaviours, we can emulate and master them. 
As children, we “find … objects around [our]selves … like meteorites from another planet 
… [only to] take possession of them and learn to use them as others use them” (Merleau-
Ponty, 1945. p.370). We see the other people of the world as a “second myself … because 
that living body has the same structure of my own” (ibid., p.370). We see our friends kick 
the football and we recognise that they do so with a foot attached to a leg like our own and 
thus we come to know; to understand how to kick. Thus it is clear that we can discover our 
own capabilities for action within those of our peers— through watching our peers make 
sense of their worlds we encounter “a miraculous extension of [our] own intentions [and] a 
familiar way of encountering the world” (ibid., p.370). We see our peers apply themselves 
to the world and we recognise that they do so in the same way that we do; we sense their 
mentality daubed over the objects of the world, we see how they become involved in their 
worlds and how they establish their networks of significance. Via observation, the 
potentialities for action uncovered by our peers become ours. This process of recognition 
and emulation opens new avenues of manipulation up to us, new worlds are disclosed to 
us. We do not need to rely on fragile detached observation to attribute meaning to the 
objects of our world, instead we either engage with the object ourselves, discovering its 
usefulness against a backdrop of goals and desires, or we can delegate the work and look at 
what usefulness our peers have discovered and mimic that. No structure of explicit beliefs 
is needed to justify these actions, to kick a ball we need not to first believe that the football 
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before us exists and nor do we need to believe it is suitable for kicking, our interactions 
and the interactions of our peers are sufficient to justify our actions. Indeed, it seems that 
these beliefs are secondary to our involvement—the fact that our foot connects with the 
ball justifies its existence and its parabolic flight path justifies its suitability for kicking. 
We need not to presuppose an internal conceptual schema of the world before we can cope 
with it in a practical manner, contrary to what Descartes and his followers believed. This 
though, is not to say that mental states can be disposed of completely—for as long as there 
is a subjective what it is like to being a human, mental states will need to be postulated to 
deal with this. Without them, our actions will lose their agency—we will not lose our 
know-how about how we do things (as the Cartesians suggest) but we will certainly lose 
sight of why we do things.  
 
3.4 PROGRESS 
 
To recap, to begin with, it was suggested that Functionalism and Representationalism 
become untenable when faced with inversion because inversion highlights a common 
premise in both theories that is problematic. To identify the premise we looked at the 
specific metaphysical situation that inversion needs to operate. Three criteria needed for 
inversion to operate were isolated. The first was that an objective, external world of objects 
that exists independently from any observers, was necessary to act as a ‘standard’ against 
which experiences can be compared in order to ascertain if they are inverted or not. The 
second criterion was that a private mental realm must be posited to ‘house’ the experiential 
data in a manner where it would not be explicitly manifest, to ensure the imperceptibility 
of inversion. The final criterion isolated was that these two worlds—of objectivity and 
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subjectivity—must have some distance between them to facilitate the doubt that inversion 
leverages.  
 
After these criteria were isolated we turned our attention to the metaphysical system that 
captured and articulated them with the greatest lucidity—Cartesian Dualism. It was 
illustrated that Descartes sculpted such a metaphysical system when he sought to isolate 
his indubitable truth—I think therefore I am—it is the vulnerability to doubt that informs 
the distinction between the two realms (Descartes, 1644. p.194–195). The res extensa 
realm, vulnerable to doubt, is the objective external world of our first criterion and the res 
cogitans realm, impervious to any doubt, is the private mental realm of our second. After 
this illustration, it was explained that the distance between the two realms (as required by 
the third criterion) was not causal, as theories that have no issue with mental-physical 
interaction are also vulnerable to inversion, but instead epistemic. This distance is best 
captured through contrasting the immanent—the intrinsically and exclusively mental—
against the transcendent—the objective and external (Dillon, 1997. p.36). Because 
Descartes believes that truth is recognisable due to its clarity and distinction (Descartes, 
1641. p.24) and the external world is vulnerable to doubt (because of the unreliability of 
our senses) it follows that we can never reliably come to know truths about the external 
world as they lack the clarity and distinction needed for truth—the only realm where such 
clarity is possible is the immanent mental realm. It is this distance that inversion leverages.  
 
Following the clarification of the distance mentioned in our third criterion, work was done 
to introduce an alternative manner of thinking about these problems. It was shown that the 
detached observation method of ‘truth-finding’—the method traditionally held dear to 
philosophers and scientists alike—causes us to take a misleading view of humanity 
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(Dreyfus, 1991. p.41–46: Heidegger, 1927. p.47). This is because by believing that we can 
discover truths about ourselves in such a way, we are encouraged to look at ourselves in 
the same manner as we would look at the objects of the world—we are encouraged to think 
of humans not in terms of who but instead in terms of what and this is erroneous. Firstly, it 
makes it seem that the way we are in the world is the same way that oranges are in a fruit 
bowl: our relationship with the world is reduced to a fact about location and proximity and 
thus it seems our worldly relations are contingent and severable (Heidegger, 1927. p.54). 
This is not so: humanity is necessarily in the world. Secondly, believing our relationship 
with the world is one of proximity encourages us to endorse the notion that our relationship 
with the world is largely disinterested, it misses out the fact that we become involved with 
the world, changing meaningless objects into meaningful entities. Humanity is not 
passively located beside objects, but is instead actively involved with them (Dreyfus, 1991. 
p.40–45). To think of humanity as in the world in its true sense is to pay attention to this 
involvement, this process of active meaning giving: to ignore it is a mistake. 
 
At this point, a possible Cartesian account of involvement was given through reference to a 
passage in Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations (1931) where Husserl posits that an agent can 
only engage with the items of the world (specifically a die in Husserl’s example) after 
“first perceiving perspectives, then synthesising the perspectives into objects, and finally 
assigning these objects a function on the basis of their physical properties” (Dreyfus, 1991, 
p.46–47) It was then highlighted that this account of involvement, where practice was 
subsequent to theory, is problematic as any beliefs given to us via synthesis are equally 
vulnerable to scepticism—how can we know our observations truly represent the nature of 
the die? From this point, we then highlighted that detached observation of the kind 
employed by Husserl, was indeed a kind of human involvement with the world—it is a 
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way of practically engaging with the world—so his notion that theory must precede 
practice is in some manner incorrect (Dreyfus, 1991. p.47ff: Heidegger, 1927. p.66–72). It 
seems therefore that we can offer an account of our relationship with the world that is 
based not necessarily in mentality, but in physical engagement and involvement: 
articulation of this account was the next objective. 
 
To do this, the errors of the Husserlian model were highlighted and it was explained that 
the Cartesian assertion that theory precedes practice was mistaken—both theorisation and 
practical engagement with an object are sufficiently able to be used for the process of 
giving the objects of the world their meanings. Of course, before this conclusion was 
drawn, an account of how this practical variant of meaning giving was articulated—it was 
shown that we do not have to rely on detached observation but instead, to find an object’s 
meaning, we can simply use it (Heidegger, 1927. p.66–72). It was also shown how the 
meanings given to the objects of the world were only suitably comprehensive when one 
did not take the object in question as an isolated entity, but instead took the object against a 
backdrop of other objects and goal orientated behaviours—for example, the hammer in a 
stonemason’s workshop is not for driving nails into a wall. It was then highlighted that we 
do not necessarily give meaning to the objects of the world through practical manipulation 
(or detached observation) upon every encounter with them—the meaning of the object: its 
what-for—is recognisable via circumspection, a special kind of perception where the 
usefulness of worldly objects is revealed to us (ibid.). Similarly, it was also shown that the 
what-for of an object can be transmitted between agents through a process of mimicry and 
imitation (Merleau-Ponty, 1945. p.370). With these processes explored and the hegemony 
of detached observation ended, the philosophical understanding necessary for an account 
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of perception sympathetic with this alternative manner of thinking is in place. Giving this 
account is our next objective.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
COLOURS, OBJECTS AND POSSIBILITIES: THE WORLD AND HOW TO 
SEE IT 
 
4.1 A BRIEF RECAP OF THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPTION OF PERCEPTION 
 
Now that our non-Cartesian paradigm has been introduced, it is pertinent to give an 
account of perception sufficiently sympathetic to this alternative approach—it makes little 
sense to argue for a position that cannot also offer a theory of perception that is 
sympathetic to the role of the human as an agent of action. Before we do so though, it 
seems wise to briefly refresh our memories of the traditional conception of perception. To 
articulate the traditional theory of perception, we shall return to the work of John Locke6. 
The process of perception shown in his work, although well-aged, still dominates 
epistemic discourse in one form or another.  
 
Locke deemed ‘ideas’ to be the basic unit of our mental worlds (2.2.2) acquirable through 
two channels: reflection and sensation (2.1.3–4). Ideas of Reflection are those which arise 
through the observation of the operations of the mind (2.6.1) and Ideas of Sensation are 
those which arise via the interaction of the external world of material objects with our 
sensory organs (2.1.3). Through this process of sensory interaction, we gain what Locke 
terms simple ideas—these are the basic units of our perceptions that can be combined in 
order to create our complex ideas. An example is likely best suited to explain this notion. 
																																																						
6 As prior, these references to Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding shall be cited in the 
customary book.chapter.section format.  
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Say, for instance, one perceives a dog. The Lockean conception of perception would argue 
that each of the dog’s phenomenally significant properties—e.g., its size, its brownness, its 
shape, its four-leggedness etc.—are the product of an interaction between the dog and our 
senses. At this point, when we are in receipt of the basic ‘dog’ properties, they are 
combined within our mental realms to produce the complex idea of a dog—our perception 
of a dog, to Locke, is constructed from atomistic elements of our phenomenal experiences. 
We take internal sensations, prompted by the objects of the world and combine them into 
rich and complex perceptions.  
 
This atomistic conception of phenomenal experience is found within the Functionalist and 
Representationalist doctrines. Functionalism looks upon qualitative states as one of the 
products of material interactions with sensory systems and it betrays its sympathies 
towards an atomistic theory of perception by assigning each quale a discrete functional 
role. For instance, a ‘red’ qualitative state has a different functional purpose than a ‘hot’ 
qualitative state (the former may simply elicit ‘red’-type utterances, the latter may prompt 
a reflexive physical ‘escape’ reaction) yet both qualitative states can be prompted by a 
singular object; a flame perhaps. Similarly, Representationalism also can be thought of as 
supporting such a conception of perception. Recall Michael Tye’s notion of PANIC (1995. 
p.137–144). The very notion of intentional content guarantees the notion that perception is 
the product of some manner of interaction between a material object and the human 
sensory systems and, moreover the abstract nature of phenomenally significant intentional 
content betrays the presence of the kind of atomism Locke spoke of. Tye claims that 
phenomenal experiences are abstract in the sense that they do not necessarily have to be 
prompted by the same object, for instance over-brewed coffee and burnt chocolate 
brownies can reliably cause the same ‘bitter’ changes in the brain. This though, seems to 
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entail a situation where one can split the whole perception down into its basic parts in 
order to isolate the shared bitter quale. If this were not so, and it was impossible to isolate 
the bitter quale shared by the two entities, it would not make sense to say that the same 
‘bitterness’ was shared by the two objects. One must be able to isolate the bitterness in 
order to claim that it is shared, and thus because the bitterness is isolatable (even in the 
crude sense of “bitterness = the presence of bitter stimulus causing this change in brain-
state”) it follows that our perceptions must be made up of discrete and isolatable 
experiences. Therefore, it is clear that both Functionalism and Representationalism have a 
distinctly Lockean slant to their theories of perception—in all three cases our perception is 
based solely upon the objects of the world stimulating our sensory organs and prompting 
discrete internal sensations.  
 
4.2 PERCEPTUAL REVOLUTION 
 
The belief that perception is fundamentally constructed through the co-presence of 
isolatable elements is helped along by its intuitive plausibility and explanatory efficacies. It 
seems to explain how one can recognise the similarity between the leaves on a birch tree, 
the flesh of a kiwi fruit and the left-most stripe on the Italian flag—they all prompt a 
‘green’ sensation. Similarly, it also seems to help us with explaining at which point an 
object can be differentiated from another—for instance, a horse and a dog share a great 
many properties (e.g., they may be coloured similarly, they are both quadrupedal, both are 
caudate, etc.) but they can be told apart on the basis of their shape, their temperament and 
the fact that the former prompts a sensation of ‘strength’ that is of a greater magnitude than 
the one prompted by the latter. But despite this, there are persuasive arguments to support 
	 88 
the denial of this constructivist theorisation of perception; the most powerful of which 
comes from Maurice Merleau-Ponty.  
 
Before Merleau-Ponty’s argument is explored, it may be useful to spend a moment making 
the motivations for attacking Perceptual Atomism clear. Beyond the failings that Merleau-
Ponty leverages in his argument, there are other reasons that we may not wish to endorse 
Atomism. For instance, Atomism commits the same error as Cartesianism in assuming that 
the human capacity for action somehow is irrelevant—both theories rely upon the mistaken 
assumption that the human is a passive entity, an unusual kind of object. To Atomism, the 
human is nothing more than a receptacle of experiential data that automatically stitches 
sensations together into coherent ideas. Moreover, Atomism operates with too narrow a 
definition of the term ‘world’. Atomism thinks of the world in the first sense, as the totality 
of objective beings. To Atomism there is nothing more to perception than an interaction 
between two passive entities; the perceived object and the perceiving ‘object’. But as we 
have shown in the previous chapter, there is more to worldliness than the brute presence of 
objects. Atomism does not pay due attention to humanity’s unique way of being in the 
world so there is no role for our arena of experiences, our networks of significance in 
Atomism. The opportunities for action and expression presented to us by the world play no 
major part in Atomism. These two qualms are not enough to defeat Atomism alone (for it 
is always possible to add auxiliary premises to absorb these criticisms) but they are enough 
for us to be enthusiastic about seizing the opportunity presented to us by Merleau-Ponty’s 
argument. The success of his argument presents us with an opportunity to build from the 
ground up a theory of perception that is sympathetic to our true worldly manner of being, 
rather than simply altering Atomism into an ad hoc ‘Frankenstein theory’ capable of 
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meeting our objections. Merleau-Ponty’s argument clears the ground needed for us to 
create something more suitable for our purposes. 
 
Merleau-Ponty’s attack on the constructivist theory of perception is motivated by his claim 
that the idea of sensations—the abstract basic units of perceptual experiences—“distorts 
the entire analysis of perception” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945. p.13)—if we are to understand 
perception in the proper manner, work must be done to dispel perception’s traditional 
atomism. The first step in demonstrating traditional perceptual atomism unattractive is to 
illustrate that the ‘atoms’ of perceptions—our sensations—are necessarily homogenous 
(Romenh-Romluc, 2011. p.37). For a sensation to be homogenous, it must be entirely 
uniform with no deviation from its intrinsic character—a sensation of redness must be red 
through and through. The argument for the homogeneity of sensations rests upon the idea 
that if one experiences an object as extended—i.e., in possession of a size, a shape and 
location—it must “already form some scene before [us … ceasing] to be a part of 
[ourselves]” (op. cit., 1945. p.3); to experience an object as extended entails that one is 
experiencing an external entity because internal mental states are not extended so this 
cannot be a case of mental self-awareness. 
 
There is an objection that can be levelled at this notion though. It is not impossible that 
experiencing extended entities is down to an internal mental state being represented as 
extended, not by directly experiencing an external world of extended objects. This 
objection can be disregarded upon the basis that it plays into the hands of noxious 
scepticism—if mental states can represent themselves as extended, then it is entirely 
fathomable that our entire experience takes place internally, leaving solipsism significantly 
more plausible than it would be otherwise. With that objection defeated it becomes 
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possible to take the notion that the experience of extended objects is an experience of an 
external entity and combine it with the notion that our experiences of external objects are 
necessarily varied, i.e., that they are not homogenous. Once this is done it leads us to the 
conclusion that internal sensations are necessarily homogenous because non-homogenous 
things belong to the external world. If an experience is varied, it must be an experience of 
an external entity and vice versa regarding homogenous experiences—they are the 
possessions of our internal mental realms. With this, the homogeneity of sensations seems 
to be secured. 
 
An objection can be levelled at the claim that the ability to differentiate between the 
elements of one’s experience is necessarily reliant upon extension. It seems that it is 
entirely plausible that one may differentiate between two sensations, associated with non-
visual sensory organs, on the basis of their phenomenal quality alone. Say for instance one 
is blindfolded and taken into a forest: one would be able to differentiate between the rustle 
of the leaves and the birdsong despite being unable to discern their physical locations with 
any precision (Romdenh-Romluc, 2011. p.38). This argument is persuasive. If one can 
differentiate between the different elements of one’s experience on the basis of pure 
phenomenal quality then it seems that the role spatiality plays in differentiation is 
overstated at best. But this does not mean that sensations are not homogenous—a more 
robust supporting argument exists. Sensations, as we have covered, are claimed to be the 
fundamental atoms of our experience: this definition is all we need to demonstrate that 
they are homogeneous. If sensations are not homogenous, it would be possible to split 
them down into their different parts and thus they would not be fundamental in much the 
same way as atomic matter cannot be thought of as fundamental because they can be 
further broken down into protons, neutrons and electrons. Therefore, by matter of 
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definition, to think of sensations as fundamental is to assent to their homogeneity (ibid.). 
This secures the first premise of our argument against the traditional, constructivist theory 
of perception. 
 
With the homogeneity of sensations successfully established, attention should be turned to 
the idea that perception of homogeneous entities is entirely impossible. Such a move is 
valuable if we are to deny the traditional conception of perception and usher in new theory 
of perception. Luckily, such a notion is supported by our experiences. Say for instance, one 
looks out of one’s window and notices a small bird sitting upon the branch of a tree. It is 
evident that one’s perception of the bird is framed by one’s simultaneous perception of the 
tree—it is impossible to isolate the bird in such a manner where it is the only element of 
one’s perception. This betrays the structure of our experiences. Our experiences are 
structured in a manner where a “figure against a background is the most basic sensible 
given” (op. cit., 1945. p.4). Our experiences are structured so that we naturally perceive a 
holistic whole that can then be broken down into two parts: the background and the figure. 
The distinction between the two is simple—the figure is that which stands out against the 
whole by means of an agent focussing their attention upon it, the background is all other 
parts of the perception. To return to our example, the bird assumes the role ‘figure’ and the 
tree, the sky, the window itself and so on, constitutes the ‘background’. If the claim that 
our perceptions are necessarily ‘layered’ in this way is true, as our experience seems to 
suggest, then perception of a homogeneous, atomic, undifferentiated ‘something’ is absurd 
(Romdenh-Romluc, 2011. p.38–39).  
 
An objection can be levelled at this way of thinking—what is there preventing us from 
perceiving a homogenous figure against a background? It seems entirely plausible that the 
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individual qualia that constitute our experiences can be homogenous and somehow stitched 
together to make the scene stretched before us. But this is not so. Allow us to posit an 
agent, born with such a disability that only their sense of hearing is functional. All other 
sensory systems, from those responsible for touch to those responsible for taste, are 
damaged in such a manner that their associated sensations are unfathomable to them—to 
our agent, ‘bitter’ and ‘red’ are naught but words. It seems to make sense therefore, that if 
one is to play them a tone of consistent quality that they would indeed be perceiving a 
homogenous sensation. But this argument denies two important features of human 
perception—temporality and spatiality. Our perceptions are temporal in the sense that they 
are always perceived as occurring at a particular instance, distinct from that which 
precedes them and that which comes after them. Our agent experiences the tone as distinct 
from that which he could hear before and it is possible to argue these previous 
experiences—because they “confer meaning on [our] current experience” (ibid., p.41)—
constitute a necessarily part of our perceptions (ibid.). Similarly, our perceptions are spatial 
in the sense that they are prompted by the objects of the world, which exist as dwelling at a 
particular location. This means that our perceptions have a sense of location conferred to 
them: perceptions occurring ‘over there’ are distinct from those which occur ‘here beside 
me’. For instance, the sight of a toy cow before oneself and a real cow some distance away 
are remarkably similar in size and quality—yet it is possible for us to distinguish between 
the two. It is not impossible that this perceived spatiality constitutes another necessary part 
of our perceptions and therefore, by virtue of the necessarily spatiotemporal nature of 
experience, the idea that we can perceive homogenous qualia is not persuasive—there is 
always a perception of temporality and spatiality alongside any quale we perceive7.  
																																																						
7 It seems as though we have neglected an argument that undermines this notion—it seems as though we can 
stabilise the background spatiotemporal variables to argue that our agent perceives a homogenous sensation 
if the tone is eternally persistent and forever perceived as ‘over-there’. Perhaps our agent has had tinnitus 
since birth. In such a situation, though, it does not seem as though our agent would constantly and uniformly 
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The above is not the only objection that can be presented against the claim that we cannot 
perceive homogenous sensations. It seems as though it is indeed possible to perceive a 
homogenous ‘something’—for instance, it seems as though one need only cover one’s 
closed eyes with a hand to experience a homogenous blackness. But I invite you to try 
this—no homogenous blackness is experienced. There is considerable visual noise to be 
found behind closed eyes (a phenomenon called Closed-Eye Visualisations). But even if 
this were not so, and one did theoretically experience homogenous blackness the 
figure/background structure of perception would still not be undermined by experience. 
We must be keen to reiterate that we are in possession of more sensory systems than vision 
alone. If we do this, it naturally leads us to the conclusion that the figure/background 
structure of perception endures. If one covers one’s closed eyes with a hand it does not 
entail that one, all of a sudden, loses the ability to smell the coffee brewing in the room 
adjacent, nor does one become incapable of hearing the chatter that surrounds them, tasting 
the mint in their mouths or feeling the touch of their clothes against their skin. It therefore 
is possible to argue that the perception of the darkness would be the figure of our 
perception and the unattended sensory chatter that necessarily accompanies it is the 
background to our perceptions; thereby demonstrating that perception of homogenous 
sensations is impossible due to the holistic nature of perception and their necessary 
figure/background structure (ibid., p.40–41). When this conclusion is taken alongside that 
from the paragraph prior, it illustrates the significant difficulties faced by the atomistic 
conception of perception.  
 
																																																																																																																																																																			
perceive the tone at full intensity—they would likely ‘get used to it’ when the tone slips from the centre of 
their attention only to have it return with full intensity when they refocus their attentions upon it. This entails 
sufficient contrast between intensity to make the perceptual background clear. The temporality highlighted 
by the statement “the tone was psychologically unbearable earlier but is isn’t too bad now” seems sufficiently 
capable to act as the background to the perception.  
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4.2.1 PERCEPTUAL HOLISM: BACKGROUND 
 
As it is clear that the atomistic conception of perception faces significant problems, it 
seems wise for us to explore an alternative that is more sympathetically aligned with the 
Non-Cartesian paradigm explored in the chapter prior—Perceptual Holism. The traditional 
conception of perception, motivated by its belief in perceptual atomism, oversimplified the 
nature of our perceptions. This oversimplification is manifested most keenly in the total 
neglect of Perceptual Holism’s defining feature: the figure/background structure of our 
perceptions. As Merleau-Ponty argues: “the perceptual ‘something’ is always in the middle 
of some other thing” (1945. p.4). The omission of the background within the traditional 
theory of perception is indeed a mistake, for the background plays a very important role in 
our perceptions—as perceptions are holistic, the background of a perception can influence 
its overall quality8. The phenomena of the figure’s quality being influenced by its 
background is at its clearest in examples concerning colours.  
 
Think of a time where one has redecorated. One goes to the hardware store and picks a 
colour out, buying enough paint to satisfy one’s needs. The person then takes it home and 
begins to paint their walls. Quite often in this situation, much to the chagrin of the 
decorator, the colour of the paint looks dissimilar to how it did in the hardware store. This 
is a real-world demonstration of how the background to the figures of our perception can 
influence their character. The difference in the perceived quality between the paint colour 
in the store and the paint colour in one’s home is not due to any changes within the 
physical structure of the paint, or a change in our sensory equipment—both remain exactly 
																																																						
8 It should be noted that whilst the traditional theory of perception omits the background of our perception, it 
does not have to omit it. It does not seem impossible to think that one could construct a background and 
figure out of atomistic parts. But to do this seems to be ad hoc endeavour to try and salvage an increasingly 
fraught theory with demonstrable flaws—one must question the motivations doing so.  
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identical—but is instead due to the quality of lighting illuminating the two locations. Shops 
tend to be illuminated with a far cleaner, brighter light than the warm lights we find in our 
homes—“changes in ambient light produce changes in the appearance of coloured objects” 
(Noë, 2004. p.125). With the change in background comes a change in perceived colour. A 
similar notion can also be demonstrated that does not entail a change in lighting quality (or 
a change in the object’s location, as implied in the above example). Think of one viewing a 
black vase with a glossy glaze, illuminated from above by a bright white light. As one 
shifts position, walking around the vase, the brilliant white highlights will shift around the 
vase in relation to the person’s position (ibid.). In a third similar phenomenon, it also 
seems that an object’s appearance is influenced by the milieu of other objects it finds itself 
amongst. For example, a small slip of grey paper appears to be of a whiter hue when 
placed against a dark background than when it is placed against a pale one (ibid.), or to 
offer another example: “view a chocolate bar in sunlight through a tube that is painted matt 
black on the inside and it will appear yellowy-orange!” (Tye, 2000. p.106). This third 
phenomenon does not just effect coloured entities; it also impacts on an object’s perceived 
size. Indeed, this is the basis of many optical illusions. Perhaps the two most famous of 
illusions which leverage this notion are the Müller-Lyer illusion where two lines of equal 
length appear to be unequal due to the addition of auxiliary lines and the Ebbinghaus 
illusion, where two identically sized circles appear dissimilar due to the additional circles 
that surround them (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2012. p.106–107). 
 
It is possible to categorise these above examples into two broad groups of what Noë calls 
“colour-critical conditions” (op. cit., 2004. p.129). The first group is movement-dependant. 
This group refers to the correlations between our movements and the changes in our 
sensory experience that they entail (ibid.). Instances where an agent moves and the object 
	 96 
remains stationary—such as the vase example above, or perhaps the way one moves back 
from a painting in a gallery so as to see its entirety (Merleau-Ponty, 1945. p.315–316)—or 
where an agent physically manipulates the object—for example, when one moves a book 
into an optimal position in order to bring its text into focus (Noë, 2015. p.79)—would 
constitute those that fall into this group. The second group, Noë calls object-dependant. 
Where our first grouping pertained to instances where the movements of the observer 
caused changes in an object’s appearance, this second grouping refers to instances where 
the object’s movements causes changes in its own appearance. Any instance where a 
change in lighting conditions causes a change in appearance would find itself in this group, 
as would the several examples used to evidence the latter phenomena in the preceding 
paragraph.  
 
There are those sympathetic to perceptual atomism who would balk at the notion that 
movement plays such an active role in our perceptions. Their objection would be based 
upon their belief in the Constancy Hypothesis. The Constancy Hypothesis holds the notion 
that our perceptual experience is an “exact ‘reproduction’ of what is perceived” 
(Romdenh-Romluc, 2011. p.42) as one of its central tenets. This “claim that there is a one-
to-one correspondence between stimulus and the effects they produce” (ibid.) naturally 
entails that sameness of stimulus is met with the sameness of experience; a ripe tomato, if 
the Constancy Hypothesis were true, would always prompt a red experience regardless of 
the context it is viewed in. Such a rigid relationship between the object and the effect it 
produces seems to be the motivation for our ability to tag the objects of the world with 
their corresponding colour terms; a strawberry is ‘red’ because it always prompts a red 
sensation, a lawn is ‘green’ because it prompts a green sensation and so on. Therefore, if 
the appearance of an object is as contingent as perceptual holism seems to entail, then it 
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seems that our ability to tag the objects of the world with colour terms is compromised—is 
a piece of paper that appears white on a black background but dark grey on a white one, 
white or grey? If the colour of an object depends on the quality of the light it is illuminated 
with, how can we say with any certainty what the object’s colour is? 
 
The above objection is bolstered by some intuitive plausibility. Whilst it seems that our 
ability to tag the objects of the world with a coloured term is impaired under a system of 
Perceptual Holism, this is not so. Perceptual Holism rejects the Constancy Hypothesis, 
instead asserting that the human ability to tag the objects of the world with colour terms is 
derivative from the notion that “learning to perceive colour is … a process of coming to 
understand the behaviour of colour as we move and as [the object’s] environmental 
conditions change” (Noë, 2004. p.126–127)9. This process of learning, of observing how 
the colours of an object vary as the movement-dependant and the object-dependant 
conditions of the object change manifests itself in our ability to reliably recognise colours 
in these different contexts and thus perceive our colours reliably. This process of learning 
might seem alien to us but there exists a similar process for the consistent recognition of 
shapes with which we may be more familiar (ibid., p.127–128). If we rest our heads upon a 
table, not only does it look vast and expansive, but it also takes on the shape of a 
trapezium. If we were asked of the shape of the table though, we would accurately report it 
as rectangular due to our ability to hark back to a time where we were “in the best context 
for perceiving [the table]” (Romdenh-Romluc, 2011. p.115). Our ability to track the 
changes in the colour of an object in order to negate them and correctly identify the colour 
of the object in a number of contexts illustrates the above objection unpersuasive.  
																																																						
9 A very similar notion is found here: (Merleau-Ponty, 1945. p.318-326.) 
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4.2.2 PERCEPTUAL HOLISM: SUBJECT 
 
It is not just the perceptual background to which the traditional theory of perception turns a 
blind eye—it also “forgets the subject of perception” (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2012. p.106) 
entirely. There are a few ways in which it does this.  
 
The first, we have already explored in some depth in the previous chapter, and is related to 
the way that the subject, i.e., humans find themselves involved (in the Heideggerian sense) 
with the world. Look around yourself. There will be a collection of objects. Amongst them, 
I would wager the presence of a desk, a chair and a pen. Now these objects are not ‘mere 
things’, but they are viewed with an eye to their usefulness in achieving a personal project. 
Your pen, for instance, is only perceived as useful in the context of your wanting to take 
notes, or jot down a phone number or some similar task. Similarly, your chair is only 
useful insofar as it is your goal to rest your legs. It is in this way that a system of 
potentialities for action in the context of one’s goals is influential to our perceptions. The 
traditional theory completely eschews this capacity to “reckon with the possible” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1945. p.112) and the role it plays on our perceptual experiences. 
 
The second sense in which the traditional theory turns a blind eye to the role that the 
perceiver plays in perception is subtle. Indeed, it is not one that we are even aware of, but 
this is not to say that it might not be important for understanding perception properly. It is 
put forwards by Merleau-Ponty that the perception of “colour has an effect on muscle 
tonicity of which the perceiving subject is not aware” (Gallagher, 2016. p.238). In his 
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work, Merleau-Ponty references experiments by Goldstein and Rosenthal upon agents with 
an ‘illness of the cerebellum or frontal cortex” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945. p.216). These 
experiments sought to study the effects of colour on the motor abilities of these agents—it 
was found that the subjects of the experiment would lift their arm in a different manner 
depending upon the quality of the visual stimulus they were presented with. For example, 
“red and yellow encourage smooth movements [when the agent raises their arm] whereas 
blue and green encourage jerky movements” (ibid.)10. It is important for us to be aware of 
this notion, because it is not impossible that these “motor accompaniment[s]” (ibid., 
p.217)—if present in healthy individuals—could have a role in how we recognise the 
colours of the objects in the world.  
 
The final manner in which the traditional theory of perception neglects the role that the 
perceiver plays in perception is probably the most significant of its omissions. It is the 
notion that “perception is not something that happens to us, or in us [but] it is something 
that we do” (Noë, 2004. p.1). The traditional theories of perception envisage humanity as a 
passive entity where the quality of our perceptions is “produced within us … by the 
operation of insensible particles on our senses” (Locke, 2.8.13). This though, completely 
denies the role that the human ability “to move, explore and act” (Gallagher, 2016. p.236) 
plays in our perceptual capacities. Humans are not passive entities. We are, under ordinary 
circumstances, mobile. We can move our bodies around the worldly objects we are 
embedded amongst. We can tilt our heads and swivel our eyes around in their sockets. We 
can scramble on the floor to see what is beneath the bed and we can stand atop a stool to 
check what titles are on the top shelf of a bookcase. Our perceptual experiences are 
demonstrably and reciprocally linked to our capacities for movement and action. The 
																																																						
10 Other examples of how the application of coloured stimulus can effect muscle tonicity can be found in 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1945. p.216-217). 
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content of our perceptions is the product of what we do, how we act, but our perceptions 
also reveal to us other potentialities for action. Our drive to get a glass of water will inform 
our movements, which in turn will inform the fact that one can see a glass from our new 
location, which then itself prompts our movements towards the tap. Understanding these 
potentialities for movement is an integral part of our perceptual capacities. To borrow an 
example from Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi (2012. p.110), imagine viewing a car. You 
stand before it and know that the ‘front’ of the car is visible from the coordinate at which 
you stand, but you also are aware that you are able to mobilise yourself. If it so pleases 
you, you could move around the car and view each of its hidden perspectives, coming to 
understand the whole of the car as an unspoken expression of ‘I am here and it looks like 
this, if I move over there then it would look like that’ type statements.  
 
This deep and symbiotic relationship between perception and movement is also interesting 
because it demonstrates how our theory of perception sidesteps the problem of scepticism 
caused by appealing to the Cartesian notions of external worlds and internal mental realms. 
If our perceptions are “determined by what we do” (Noë, 2004. p.1) then it follows that our 
phenomenally conscious experiences are not due to any internal sensations, or any kind of 
neural representations, but are instead due to our ability to directly access the worlds in 
which we are embedded. To assert that our consciousness is somehow bundled up within 
neural representations of our world is erroneous, primarily because it is redundant (op. cit., 
2012. p.110–111). We do not need to make up an internal replica of our environment, 
complete with all of the information necessary for us to act and achieve our goals, when all 
of that information is available out there in the world and accessible to us simply by 
moving ourselves into a position from which we may retrieve it. If we intend to bake a 
cake, we do not need to hold the recipe in our minds—we can always check our next step 
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by looking back into the recipe book. Such is the same with our perceptions. By not 
requiring any internal representations in our theory of perception, we do not need to 
engage with the interior/exterior dichotomy in the way that lends inversion scenarios their 
tenacity. 
 
This alone though, does not properly articulate what a perception actually is—stating what 
something isn’t does not tell us what it is. To understand perception, we must understand 
that a perception cannot be reduced to static entities such as neural representations or 
visual impressions—“perception is … a kind of skilful activity” (Noë, 2004. p.2). This 
means that a perception is an instance of activity, a specific occurrence of ‘perceiving’ in 
much the same way that a ‘run’ is a specific instance of ‘running’. To perceive is to 
become involved with the world in a meaningful way; significant similarities between 
perception and the kind of goal-orientated action typical of Heidegger’s thinking can be 
drawn. In both instances, we skilfully manipulate some form of equipment in order to 
achieve our goals. It is just so that, when perceiving, the equipment we manipulate is our 
own bodies—our sensory systems. We have become blind to the fact that perceptions are 
not reducible to any ‘thing’, precisely because of our skill in manipulating our sensory 
‘equipment’. We forget that our vision (as an example) is the product of implicit learned 
knowhow of how to, amongst other things, regulate the amount of light that enters our 
eyes, how to stretch or squeeze our lenses, how our head and eye movements impact upon 
what we can see and how to distinguish between the important (read: goal critical) and 
unimportant elements of our whole visual fields. We can even experience a breakdown in 
our abilities to manipulate our sensory equipment in the same way as we can when 
manipulating tools—it seems unlikely that there is anybody unfamiliar with the struggle to 
groggily focus their eyes when woken abruptly. Similarly, take a child to a hall of mirrors 
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and one can observe how they struggle to reconcile their movements with those of their 
reflections. Such instances reinforce the claim that to perceive is the skilful manipulation 
our sensory equipment, thereby making it clear that there is nothing in the world we can 
point to and say “that is a perception”. Perceptions are not things. They are instances of 
human action.  
 
4.3 OF COLOURED OBJECTS 
 
If we are to demonstrate that inversion is philosophically unproblematic, we need to turn 
our eye to a theory of colour. If we are to shift our paradigm away from Cartesianism its 
replacement must engage with all the topics that it engages—one of these is colour. So, for 
the sake of the completeness of our alternative paradigm, we must articulate a theory of 
colour that is suitably sympathetic towards it. It is important though, before we articulate 
this alternative theory of colour, that we understand where it sits in relation to the theories 
of colour forged under the hegemony of the Cartesian Paradigm. 
 
Our first traditional colour theory is Subjectivism; a theory that works closely with the 
Cartesian distinction between exterior and interior. The best Subjectivist account of colour 
is articulated by John Locke. As we have explored in the opening chapter of this work, 
Locke thinks of colour as one of an object’s secondary properties. For an object to possess 
a colour, to Locke, is for it to possess a particular corpuscular arrangement which has the 
power to prompt ideas of colour inside our interior mental realms (2.8.8). It is important to 
highlight that because the coloured experience is only present in our mental realms, our 
experiences of colour do not reveal the true nature of the objects of perception in respect of 
colour. Quite simply, secondary qualities do not resemble the objects of the world (2.8.15). 
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Instead of perceiving the reality of colour—i.e., a specific corpuscular arrangement—we 
experience a sensation of the colour that the specific corpuscular arrangement has the 
power to prompt within us. This entails that colours are not properly instantiated in a way 
that is consistent with the experience of them, instead they exist only as the power of 
appropriately configured material to prompt coloured sensations within us—meaning 
Locke’s theory of colour is overtly Subjectivist (Smart, 1961). This means that the 
blueness of the clear summer sky is only a property of the sky in the sense that it is 
materially configured in such a way that it prompts a ‘blue’ experience within us (Hardin, 
1988. p.59). If, somehow, we were able to pierce the veil of perception, we would not see a 
blue entity but rather a complex colourless collection of corpuscular matter. Blue, as we 
know it, only exists as a ‘blue’ internal experience. This theory of colour runs into 
considerable problems. This is primarily because it severs our link to the world in a deeply 
profound manner—a veil of perception is drawn over the world and we become lodged in a 
world of ideas that necessarily misleads us regarding the true nature of the world—we see 
the world as coloured, but if colours only exist as configurations of material it follows that 
we never see things how they truly are. This is a consequence that lends itself well to the 
particularly noxious varieties of scepticism.  
 
The Subjectivist ‘colours as powers’ theory, of the kind espoused by Locke, can be 
contrasted with the Objectivist theory of colour. The Subjectivist position holds that 
phenomenal colours only exist in the observers of the world, never to be physically 
instantiated in a way sympathetic to our experiences of them; the colours of worldly 
objects can therefore be thought of as a property that becomes instantiated when a 
particular relation between the objects of the world and their observers holds. Those 
sympathetic to Objectivist conceptions of colours deny this. Colour to the Objectivists, is 
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not a property instantiated when a relation between object and observer is of a certain kind, 
but instead a property of the worldly objects alone (Smart, 1961); colours under this 
doctrine are “quite independent from human or other sentient beings” (Hardin, 1988. p.59). 
Just as the size of an object is due to its physical properties, the colour of an object is also a 
physical property (or a collection of properties) possessed by the object. The most likely 
candidate for this property is Surface Spectral Reflectance (herein, SSR)—i.e., an object’s 
tendency to reliably reflect a proportion of light at the wavelengths associated with the 
visible spectrum (Byrne and Hilbert, 2003). For instance, two objects of identical colour 
would also have an identical SSR. In addition, if we were to take three objects that are 
resemble each other—perhaps forget-me-nots, bluebells and cornflowers—they resemble 
each other by the virtue of the similarity of their respective SSRs. This theory, because of 
its instance that colour is mind-independent, benefits from the ability to neatly explain the 
phenomena of colour constancy—if colours are naught more than a disposition to reflect a 
specific proportion of light at the different visible-spectrum wavelengths, then this 
disposition does not alter in different perceptual circumstances (Noë, 2004. p.151). If a ripe 
strawberry is disposed to reflect ‘red-wavelength’ light in the midday sun, it does not 
suddenly become disposed to reflect ‘green-wavelength’ light when illuminated by 
candlelight. Indeed, this initially seems to make the problem of inversion wholly non-
existent (thus eradicating the need to move away from Cartesiansism to dissolve the 
problem)—if colours are properties of objects, independent from observers, then there is 
simply no room for inversion to occur; phenomenal experiences do not factor into colours 
under the Objectivist doctrine so there is simply nothing there to be inverted.  
 
Things are not so straight forward though; Objectivism runs into considerable problems. 
The first of these is directly concerned with Objectivism’s Phenomenal Eliminativism. If 
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we are to argue that ‘red’ is nothing but some tendency to reflect certain wavelengths of 
light with certain intensities, it follows that we are “[grounding] the objectivity of colour at 
the cost of the phenomenality of colour” (ibid.). To argue that colours are objective 
properties of worldly objects is to misunderstand the manner in which we know and 
understand colours. Imagine you have a yellow ball before yourself. How is it that you 
come to know that the ball before you is yellow? It is erroneous to assert that you know the 
ball before you is yellow because it has the tendency to reflect light of a particular 
wavelength with a particular intensity—this is secondary to the true manner in which you 
know the yellowness of the ball. You know the ball before you is yellow, fundamentally, 
because it looks yellow—any reference to the tendency of its surface to reflect a certain 
wavelength of light at a certain intensity is an attempt to explain why the ball looks yellow 
to you. The phenomenality of colour is the more fundamental issue; to cut 
phenomenality—the way colours look—out of the equation is unwise precisely because it 
is the phenomenality of colours which these theories seek to explain. To ignore the looks 
of colours removes the motivations for giving a theory of colour in the first place and as 
such, any theory of colour that does so is severely weakened. But this is not the only 
objection that can be levelled at this kind of Objectivism. A similar objection can be made 
by appealing to the existence of metameric pairs—objects that look the same, 
chromatically speaking, but have the tendency to reflect light of different wavelengths at 
different intensities. Instances of metamerism demonstrate that two objects, with two 
different SSRs, can produce identical effects upon the human nervous system; the 
differences in the SSRs are visually imperceptible (ibid., p.152). This highlights the odd 
conclusion that must be drawn from the Objectivist theory of colour—if it is true that 
colour is nothing but a tendency to reflect light of a particular quality, then our colour 
vision is no reliable guide to colour. There is no way of ensuring that our experiences are 
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veridical and thus the same scepticism that haunts Cartesianism returns to us here. 
Objectivism is still problematic even if we are to take on board the proposal to redefine 
colours not as singular SSRs, but instead groupings or types of SSRs, as suggested by 
Byrne and Hilbert (2003). Under this revision, ‘blue’ objects would belong to one type of 
SSR, ‘red’ objects would belong to another and so on and so forth. Whilst this might be 
enough to solidify the link between colour vision and object colour, it still does little to 
render Objectivism attractive: our phenomenal experiences of still have primacy, they are 
the source of our conceptions of colours. If we cut out the phenomenality of colours and 
claim that ‘redness’ is an object’s possession of a particular type of SSR, then we must ask 
ourselves where we got the concept of ‘redness’ from in the first place (op. cit., 2004. 
p.152–153). Any answer that does not appeal to the way colours look will have difficulty 
in asserting its persuasiveness.  
 
Clearly, both Subjectivism and Objectivism encounter problems. Subjectivism lends itself 
well to the sceptic’s causes and Objectivism excludes the phenomenality of colour from 
the equation: neither of these consequences are particularly appealing. Therefore, it seems 
to be a good time to explore an alternative theory of colour—one sympathetic to our 
emerging paradigm that does not run into the same problems as the theories above.  
 
4.3.1 PHENOMENAL OBJECTIVISM  
 
Let us list the components whose necessity for perception can plausibly be argued for. This 
will be valuable in order to produce a simple diorama of a perceptual experience—
articulating the necessities will help us in our identification of an alternative. Firstly, it is 
obvious that there must be an agent present to perceive—a perception without a perceiver 
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is simply nonsensical. Similarly, a perception is not possible if there is nothing there to 
perceive, so we can add both a perceiver and a ‘something perceived’ to our list. Finally, if 
there is a perceiver it seems sensible to say that there is a somewhere where the perception 
is taking place—as Heidegger’s work demonstrated, perceivers are naturally and 
necessarily worldly. As is clear, these three components resonate well with Merleau-
Ponty’s suggestion that “a figure against a background is the most basic sensible given” 
(1945, p.4). It seems that if we are to provide an account with both explanatory simplicity 
and completeness on its side, our solution should be forged from these three requirements.  
 
Fortunately, there is a theory of colour that satiates our desideratum: Alva Noë’s 
Phenomenal Objectivism. Phenomenal Objectivism neatly explains the propensity of an 
object’s appearance to change in different ‘background’ circumstances using only the three 
‘variables’ of perception mentioned above. Say we take our white dog for a walk under the 
orange glow of a sodium streetlamp on a cold December evening—when we glance down 
at our friend, we cannot deny that he looks orange. It would only be in reference to another 
situation, where our dog was illuminated with the whiter light of day, that we would be 
able to assert that our pet is white (if we destroyed that frame of reference, we would 
believe our dog to be orange). This is because our pet is as much orange under the light of 
a street lamp as it is white under the midday sun; our dog is orange when under an orange 
light because the colour of an object is not something that is independent of the way it 
looks. The colour of an object is nothing more than the way it looks to us (Noë, 2004. 
p.141).  
 
Grounding a theory of colour in looks seems to be an odd move for a theory of colour to 
make. Surely, if it is so that the colour of an object is set by the way it appears to us, this 
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plays straight into the hands of inversion? Whilst it does undoubtedly seem this way, it is 
not so. Phenomenal Objectivism, as its name suggests, also asserts that the colours that we 
see are objective—i.e., there is nothing beyond phenomenal experiences of colour other 
than the way they look to us, but there is no real play in the way these objects look—they 
have to look a certain way to us. This is ground shared with ‘standard’ Objectivism, 
although, both theories differ in the way they achieve their objectivity. Whereas ‘standard’ 
Objectivism derives its objectivity by appealing to physical chromatic properties (such as 
SSRs), Phenomenal Objectivism argues that this is not the way in which objectivity arises. 
For the Phenomenal Objectivist, the chromatic appearances of an object are set, not by 
physical nature of the object itself, but instead by a property that is instantiated when there 
is a certain kind of relationship that holds between the object and the background against 
which it stands (ibid., p.144). Our dog, he looks orange to us (and therefore is orange) in 
those particular conditions—his ‘orangeness’ is instantiated by virtue of the relationship 
he has with the world around him. Should any of the ‘colour critical conditions’ alter, i.e., 
if we or the object were to move, there will be ramifications for the colour of the object—
should the relationship between the object and the world change, so too will the 
instantiated colour. It is best therefore to think of colour as existing as a “genuine [feature] 
of the environment” (ibid., emphasis added). Colours, therefore, have no physical 
instantiation11—it is impossible to hold a colour—but this does not impact upon the 
objectivity that they draw from their status of ‘environmental features’. The necessary 
existence of a world in perception guarantees the presence of a relationship between an 
																																																						
11 One may ask how it is possible to perceive something that is not physically instantiated—a relation seems 
to provide us with nothing to perceive. But it is normal to perceive these kind of ‘relational’ properties—we 
perceive our houses as bigger than our cars, our coffee as hotter than ice cream and the sun brighter than 
candlelight. Indeed, it is also possible for us to perceive even ultra-subjective ‘relational’ properties with the 
entities we are involved with (in the Heideggarian sense)—we recognise our friends within a crowd of people 
with the same ease as we recognise our coffee mug amongst its brothers. In both cases, we perceive 
something that is not physically instantiated in addition to the physically instantiated entities—the same is 
possible for colours.  
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object and its situation: because one cannot remove the objects of perception from their 
worlds, there is always a set of relational properties present in the world. It is not 
unfathomable that one of these may be colour.  
 
This seems to have strange repercussions to our standard way of understanding colours. 
Say for instance, we hold a Union Jack in complete darkness. Our standard way of course 
of action would be, if asked to describe the colour of the flag in our hand, to reply “red, 
white and blue”. We would not be incorrect in this reply. But what this reply does though, 
is violate the phenomenology of our experience. Say we looked down at the flag; we 
would not experience any colours, only darkness. It follows that in this situation our reply 
is not grounded in our current experiences, but past experiences of the flag, where we have 
viewed it under typical conditions (typical conditions here, is not meant in a wide sense; 
what may be typical to one may not be for another—it should be interpreted as nothing 
beyond “the colour critical conditions X agent spends most of their time under”). Indeed, a 
very similar process is used to recognise the ‘true’ nature of colours in atypical conditions 
(as opposed to complete darkness). In much the same way that we can recognise the 
circularity of a plate even though our experience of may be elliptical, we can also 
recognise the ‘true’ nature of colours—we can simultaneously perceive the invariant ‘way 
it is’ and the ‘way we see it’ of a coloured object through a process Noë calls ‘presence in 
absence’. The same phenomena are also responsible for our ability to know that car is in 
possession of a front, even when viewing it from the rear. We know it is present because of 
the typical experiences we have of the car—our perceptions are a hybrid of the ‘way it is’ 
(typical experiences) and the ‘way it is for me now’ (atypical experiences). There are 
problems that arise from this—they shall be discussed later.  
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One of the boons of Phenomenal Objectivism is its ability to provide an account of 
objectivity that does not fall into the same pitfalls as Objectivism. Not only does it not 
commit Objectivism’s fatal mistake of neglecting the phenomenality of colours, but by not 
pinning colours directly upon the objects of the world alone, we do not have problems with 
‘multiple realisation’. If colour was purely due to the object alone, it would follow that the 
colour of the object would be constant throughout the whole range of colour critical 
conditions—a strawberry in blue light would as be as red as those glistening under the 
midday sun. This is clearly in violation of our experiences. Phenomenal Objectivism 
explains this problem away by making colour not just object dependent, but also 
environment dependant—the appearances of objects vary depending on their contexts, just 
as they do in our experience. 
 
Let us return to the notion of ‘presence in absence’ and use it to offer an objection to 
Phenomenal Objectivism. Let us look in particular at an objection raised by Keith Allen 
(2009). As we have briefly described, there is a parallel drawn by Noë between the way in 
which we perceive colour and the way in which we perceive shapes—in both cases, the 
location of the observer impacts upon the quality of the perceptual experience. We see both 
colours and shapes as they appear from ‘over here’—circular plates look elliptical when 
viewed from an acute angle (Noë, 2004. p.127–128). Recall though, that Noë posits that in 
both instances we can recognise the true nature of the object of our perception—i.e., how it 
is in reality—through what he calls ‘presence in absence’—the ability to perceive that 
which is beyond phenomenal appearances (ibid., p.62–63: p.128). This is where the 
analogy between perceiving shapes and colours begins to break down. One would not deny 
that there is a legitimate objective character to a shape, and the perception of this invariant 
‘real’ character (alongside the perception of the variant subjective character of a shape) is 
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by reference to a time where one was in the proper context to perceive it. But this is not so 
with colours—Noë actively denies that there is more to a colour than how it appears; there 
are no invariant ‘real’ colours for us to perceive (ibid., p.141). Colours are just looks. This 
would not be an issue if it were not for the fact that Noë attributes the ‘actual’ colours of 
worldly objects with an important functional role—it is the “actual colour of [an] object … 
which governs or regulates the way [changes in colour] unfold” (ibid., p. 128). It is the 
“actual colour” of a ripe tomato, that makes it appear red in white light or purple-black in 
blue light. The tension with claiming that colours are nothing but looks, but that ‘actual’ 
colours help to inform these looks is clearly problematic.  
 
This incoherence does not mean that we have to abandon the Phenomenal Objectivist 
position—it remains viable so long as it can be modified. We must borrow a distinction, 
not made by Noë, but suggested by Allen (2009), between what Allen calls Non-
Perspectival looks and Perspectival looks. Perspectival looks (P-looks herein) are the 
looks of an object that are set by the relationship between the object and the world, or more 
specifically: the object of perception and the conditions of perception (ibid.). As such these 
P-looks are properties of the environment that are only capable of being seen from 
particular perceptual circumstances12. As such, we can think of our dog appearing orange 
under street-lights, or a strawberry looking purple-black in blue light as examples of P-
looks. Non-Perspectival looks (NP-looks herein) on the other hand, are the looks of the 
object which “transcends specific conditions of observation” (ibid., p.666). As such, NP-
looks are those where perception does not depend upon the conditions in which they are 
																																																						
12 To better understand this, it may be valuable to provide examples of similar phenomena. The two keenest 
example of a perceiver’s location ‘unlocking’ the ability to see the P-looks of an entity, by my estimations, 
are articulated in the fact that a perceived rainbow is unique to a particular observer and that particular 
rainbow can only be seen from the specific location of the observer, and the fact that one cannot see the 
objects that inhabit another room in the building from the one in which you stand—if one wants to access 
those objects, clearly one needs to move to accommodate for it. 
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being perceived—they are the kind of looks that ‘cut through’ all of the P-looks that arise 
from changes of perceptual condition, those which someway persist between variant 
experiences. It is the NP-looks of an object that are responsible for the ‘regulation’ of the 
object’s P-looks . This seems to untangle the incoherency of Phenomenal Objectivism: if 
we think of the NP-looks of an object as their ‘actual colour’ there is little issue with 
claiming that the ‘actual colour’ of objects play such an important role.  
 
With the objection raised by Allen (2009) defeated we are now in a position where our 
emerging paradigm is satisfactorily complete. We have not only articulated a theory of 
worldly involvement that is not in violation of phenomenology, but we have also built 
upon this to forge a theory of perception and a theory of colour that is sympathetic to this 
alternative system. The time has come for us to replace not only the paradigm of 
Cartesianism, but also those theories formed under the shadow of its erroneous view of 
humanity, which under the guise of explanatory efficacy, lent Cartesianism its 
legitimacy—Perceptual Atomism and the competing traditional theories of colour.  
 
4.4 PARADIGM SHIFT AND INVERSION 
 
As we have explored previously, traditional theories of perception are unattractive because 
of the problems they encounter. The traditional atomistic theory of perception suffers from 
the fact that it posits that our experience is made up of atomistic sensations, a notion that 
has problems with coherency. Sensations are traditionally thought of as homogenous, and 
as Merleau-Ponty demonstrates, the perception of homogenous ‘things’ is impossible 
because of both the figure/background structure of our experiences and the necessary 
spatiotemporal element to our experiences. To base a theory of perception upon 
imperceptible entities is clearly absurd, so Merleau-Ponty’s suggestion that the notion of 
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sensation achieves little beyond the “distort[ion of] the entire analysis of perception” 
(1945. p.13) becomes eminently persuasive. Similarly, problems also haunt the traditional 
theories of colour—Subjectivism leads us into a world experienced from behind an 
impenetrable veil of scepticism and Objectivism completely neglects colour’s most salient 
characteristic: its phenomenality. The problems encountered by the traditional theories of 
perception and colours suggest that a shift in paradigm is necessary—a shift that is realised 
by endorsing that which we have articulated above: Perceptual Holism and a modified 
version of Phenomenal Objectivism.  
 
The shift away from the traditional Cartesian paradigm, in addition to sidestepping the 
problems of the above theories, also seems to provide us with a novel solution to our 
inversion problem—it is not a problem at all. We must not forget that inversion draws its 
potency from leveraging the inability of the internal mental realm to interact with the 
external physical realm and vice versa—our new paradigm does not engage with the 
distinction between inside and outside. And moreover, the distinction is one definitive of 
the Cartesian Paradigm—the same paradigm that Locke, the first major articulator of the 
problem of inversion operated within. This means that the problem of inversion is a 
uniquely Cartesian problem—a relic from an old system. Therefore, to talk of inversion in 
our new paradigm—the one based upon worldly, active and embodied thinking—is akin to 
lording the failures of Geocentrism over Copernicus and Galileo. Indeed, it is even 
possible to go so far as to suggest that if one struck the Cartesian model from history and 
instead replaced it with the system described above—which does not make Descartes’ 
mistakes—the problem of inversion would never arise. There is nothing within these 
alternative methods of understanding perception that lends itself particularly well to 
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inversion; the radical scepticism that inversion suggests simply does not present itself 
under this alternative paradigm.  
 
Those sympathetic to the old Cartesian system would likely balk at this notion. They 
would be quick to argue that the problems of inversion are just as applicable to the 
alternative system and that is possible to overlay the problems of Cartesianism onto this 
replacement paradigm. The alternative paradigm suggests that inversion—the process of 
receiving qualia from an object at odds with its ‘actual’ colour—is only possible if the 
background of the object is of a nature sympathetic to the inversion; sameness of 
background entails the sameness of qualia and any ‘mismatch; of qualia must be supported 
by a parallel change in the quality of the perceptual background. The Cartesian would deny 
this and argue that inversion is possible even in situations where sameness of background 
is maintained and indeed, they would be correct in asserting this. There may well be 
inverted agents amongst us. Actual agents with various kinds of colour-blindness do little 
to dissuade us from believing inversion possible—the idea that an agent might see red 
where his peers see green is no less plausible than an agent with achromatopsia, unable to 
see colour at all. But then one must ask what it is that is interesting about making such a 
move? So what if there are inverted individuals? We do not trouble ourselves with 
‘conventionally’ deviant phenomenal experiences; we do not feel the need to re-evaluate 
our relationship with the world when we meet someone who wears glasses, or cannot 
distinguish between red and green, so why should we privilege inversion just because of its 
extremeness? The Cartesian preoccupation with the problem of inversion is understandable 
because, should one endorse the Cartesian system, it threatens our entire ability to engage 
with the world, but our alternative system encounters no such problem. If our engagements 
with the world are reliant upon some manner of internal representation of the world then it 
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is clear why inverted experiences (and, by extension, all other kinds of variant phenomenal 
experiences) present such an issue. If there are ‘hidden’ inverted agents amongst us, it is 
plausible that our internal understanding of the world is incorrect and this threatens 
everything; the chance that our inner world is not veridical leaves us lost, paralysed by 
doubt and unable to either act with agency or to imbue the objects of the world with any 
meaning. This is not so with our theory because it claims that we are in direct contact with 
the world—the internal theatre of experience is no longer needed in order for us to operate. 
We do not need this internal world to act—we can just act. We are already ‘out there’ in 
the world, as is made evident by thinking of perception as a kind of action and colours as a 
kind of environmental property. It does not matter if an agent is inverted, because the agent 
is still free to act, to make sense of their world on the basis of what they can do with it, 
rather than what it looks like to them. Should we take this enactive view, then the problem 
of inversion is not worthy of its name—there is no longer any philosophical benefit to be 
gained from dwelling upon it. The problem is a problem no longer. Moreover, one must 
inquire about the motivations of levelling the charge of inversion against this alternative 
system. Just what does doing so seek to achieve? It surely seeks to hobble this alternative 
system and make it unattractive, but say this is successful: we would only then have to 
contend with the problems of the traditional atomistic theory of perception, an equally 
flawed theory of colour and a supporting paradigm capable of being derailed by the mere 
threat of deviant coloured experiences. Because of this, it is difficult to argue that 
superimposing the problems of Cartesianism onto its competitor has any real purpose 
beyond trying to defend an aging and increasingly incapable system via the misguided 
application of a dated objection. As such, by both the virtue of the unmotivated nature of 
these attacks and the fact that inversion does not seem to be worthy of any philosophical 
engagement, we are understandably justified in our wishes to condemn the problem of 
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inversion to the annals of history—inversion belongs to Cartesianism so with Cartesianism 
it should stay.  
 
  
	 117 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
C.1 TWO BRIEF OBJECTIONS 
 
Within this work we have offered an alternative theory of perception and colour and whilst 
this theory does not fall foul of the same objections as its Cartesian predecessor, this 
should not be taken as a sign that no objections can be levelled at it—we shall explore two 
of the more pressing objections imminently.  
 
One possible objection relates to NP-looks. These are those looks, set by the relationship 
between the object and the world, that are not impacted upon by the perceptual conditions 
of the observer. NP-Looks are the ‘looks’ that cut through all perceptual experiences of an 
object—they are how we can recognise the redness of a strawberry, even under atypical 
conditions. The objection though is one of how we come to recognise the NP-Looks of an 
object. It would seem that their perspectival brothers have primacy in our phenomenal 
experiences. Even though we can recognise the redness of a strawberry illuminated by blue 
light, there is no doubt that the strawberry, in a brute sense, looks to be black. The NP-
Looks don’t form part of our visual experiences in this way—they seem to sit beyond that 
which we can actually see, so questions of how we can come to know them seem to be 
highlighting a just objection.  
 
This, though, is not so—the objection holds no water. It is not hard to argue that humans 
are capable of acquiring new perceptual abilities. We can learn to perceive new things. For 
instance, adept guitar players can tune their guitars with surprising accuracy because they 
	 118 
can perceive that the note they just played on their fifth string is (or is not) an A. To those 
who do not share such knowledge the sound is meaningless beyond a simple aesthetic 
value. Similarly, an experienced chef can tell the correct time to add the herbs and spices 
into a dish from sight alone—they perceive that now is the correct time. These kind of 
perceptions are acquired through a learning process: they are not given but they are earned. 
We can rebut the objection by arguing that NP-Looks are an example of this kind of 
‘earned’ perception—we come to be able to perceive the NP-Looks of an object through 
the routine observation of the way they cause the objects of the world to alter in colour.  
 
Another possible objection could be that to ascribe to the Modified Phenomenal 
Objectivist’s position is to also bind oneself into a kind of ‘Projectivism’. It does not seem 
that the position rules out the possibility that the objects of the world, when taken in 
isolation, are actually colourless, only gaining their chromatic properties under particular 
environmental conditions. This would entail that the colours we perceive objects to be may 
not be representative of their true natures. It is not hard to see why a theory would want to 
avoid this charge. This objection, though, is based upon flawed premises. The ability to 
separate an object from its world—the ability to is view an object in total isolation—is 
necessary for the objection to be persuasive. This is not an actuality that can be realised: 
one can never physically separate an entity from the world completely. As with humans, it 
is possible only to change the relationship an object has with the world, not to destroy the 
relationship altogether. This objection relies on impossible premises to supply it with its 
persuasiveness and therefore can be disregarded.  
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C.2 CONCLUSION 
 
This work has endeavoured to demonstrate the problem of inversion to be unworthy of its 
status as a philosophical problem. Our work towards this began by examining the first 
articulation of the problem of inversion, found within the philosophical work of John 
Locke. The metaphysics in John Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding was 
first explored on order to ground the idea within the appropriate epoch. Locke presents a 
largely physicalist view of the world—despite espousing Substance Dualism he reserves 
immaterial matter for God alone (Stuart, 2016. p.73) and thus presents a view largely 
consistent with the Materialism of contemporary Metaphysics. This physicalist 
metaphysical frame was maintained throughout the work. Similarly, we used Locke’s work 
on the metaphysics of mind to introduce Physicalism as a theory of mind; our exploration 
of the various alternative theories of mind led us to into concluding that Locke deemed the 
workings of the material constituents of the world to be ultimately responsible for 
consciousness (Ayers, 1993. 2, p.148). Attention then turned to what Locke thought 
consciousness to be—the traditional reflexive view of consciousness usually attributed to 
Locke was dismissed on the grounds that it brings about an infinite regress. An alternative 
view, more sympathetic to the phenomenological tradition, which thinks of consciousness 
as a hybrid of reflexivity and perception (Weinberg, 2008) was instead argued for. With 
these frames in place, the work introduced the problem of inversion as articulated by 
Locke.  
 
Locke deemed the possibility of inversion scenarios to be a non-issue, even going so far as 
to claim that understanding inversion brings no “improvement of our knowledge or 
conveniency of life … so we need not trouble ourselves with it” (2.32.15. p.389). The next 
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section sought to prove this assertion misguided by demonstrating the damage that 
inversion scenarios cause. Of course though, inversion is of no consequence if it cannot 
occur. There are Philosophers that would be quick to argue that such scenarios are not 
feasible, for instance C. L. Hardin (1987) whose claim that inversion scenarios are 
impossible due to the asymmetries in our phenomenal experiences is explored and 
contrasted with Levine (1991) who argues that Hardin’s thesis crumbles so long as one 
believes one can separate the chromatic and non-chromatic quale from each other. For 
those that deny that phenomenal experiences are not atomistic, the feasibility of inversion 
scenarios—at least on a logical level—is guaranteed by Shoemaker’s novel response to 
inversion deniers: even if our human experiences are not invertible due to their 
asymmetries, this does not mean that we cannot posit an agent with experiences vulnerable 
to inversion (1982). With the feasibility of inversion guaranteed we moved into a position 
where we were able to articulate, with proper authority, the problems caused to 
Functionalism and Representationalism. The theories as articulated by Hilary Putnam 
(1967) and Michael Tye (1995:2000) were explored and the problem that inversion causes 
were examined. For Functionalism, inversion demonstrates the theory to be incomplete—
we can posit two agents with functional parity that are in different mental states by virtue 
of their different chromatic experiences (Fodor, 1981) and thus, mentality cannot be 
properly expressed in functional terms.  A similar charge was levelled at 
Representationalism. As we explored, the presence of an inversion scenario would—under 
Representationalism—mean that a single worldly object would be accompanied by two 
different phenomenal experiences (Shoemaker, 1994). This entails two possible scenarios, 
that phenomenal content is not intentional (therefore illustrating the explanatory 
insufficiencies of Representationalism) or that phenomenal content is intentional, but the 
objects of the world can be two colours simultaneously. Shoemaker’s (1994:2000) 
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arguments for the latter were shown to be untenable by virtue of their consequences. 
Should Shoemaker be correct, it would mean that each object of the world was in 
possession of an infinite amount of properties and in addition, there is no mechanism in 
Representationalism that would account for why we should perceive one of these 
properties over the others. Similarly, Tye’s objections to inversion were shown to be 
inconsistent with his own theory, and thus, in the absence of any persuasive rebuttals 
inversion is given free rein to rend Representationalism as untenable as Functionalism. 
 
Functionalism and Representationalism are both able to be rendered untenable by the 
threat of inversion scenarios. How can this be so? It was suggested that the efficacy with 
which inversion renders the theories untenable was not because it attacks each theory in 
isolation, but instead because it erodes the soft sand on which they are built—an implicit 
premise has been integrated into both theories and it is that which inversion leverages. This 
premise is the  The Invertible Metaphysic, a metaphysical system that relies on three 
central tenets: the existence of an external world full of objective entities, the existence of 
a distinct private mental realm and sufficient distance between the two to allow doubt to 
flourish. It was shown how Functionalism and Representationalism can be mapped onto 
this metaphysic before then exploring the metaphysic more broadly. The metaphysic in 
question can be traced back to the influential work of Rene Descartes: it is the cogito and 
its consequences that lends this metaphysic much of its authority. It is through the 
application of radical doubt that Descartes cleaves our world into two. The ushering in of 
this dichotomy, though useful in providing science its plausibility in Descartes’ era, is not 
attractive today. The Invertible Metaphysic causes us to take an incorrect view of 
humanity: it encourages us to look upon ourselves not as a who, but as a what: a move that 
strips humanity of its most salient characteristics.  
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The work of Heidegger (1927) was examined in order to re-establish that which was 
missed out in the traditional conception of humanity: our inviolable link with our spheres 
of experience (ibid., p.65) and our uniquely human tendency to become involved with the 
objects of the world (ibid., p.54–61 : p.66–72). An account from Husserl (1931) which 
attempted to explain how involvement was possible under the Invertible Metaphysic by 
appealing to detached observation, was given in an effort to re-establish the dominance of 
the Cartesian Tradition, but this was shown simply to be playing into Heidegger’s hands: 
the account Husserl gives is an example of one of the kinds of involvement that Heidegger 
speaks of. The second kind of involvement—one centred not around detached observation 
but instead around practical meaning giving—was shown to mark the break with the 
traditional Cartesian paradigm. It was with this exploration into practical, engaged 
meaning giving that the hegemony of detached observation fell, clearing the ground for a 
theory of perception sympathetic to this new engaged and worldly way of doing things.  
 
Before this theory of perception, sympathetic to our alternative paradigm, could be 
articulated with due authority we first had to demonstrate its predecessor to be unattractive. 
Traditionally, perception was thought to be the process of mentally synthesising isolatable 
and atomistic internal sensations. These sensations are prompted by worldly stimulus and 
synthesised internally in such a way that a cohesive idea of the worldly stimulus is formed. 
This traditional Constructivist approach was shown to be incoherent by Maurice Merleau-
Ponty who argued that sensations must be homogenous, but homogenous perceptions are 
impossible due to their necessary figure/background structure (1945. p.4). Following this 
an alternative to the traditional approach, sympathetic to the active, worldly paradigm 
ushered in by Heidegger was given. It was illustrated how the traditional theory of 
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perception is lacking in necessary complexity—it completely neglects the arena of 
perception (our world) and thus leaves out the figure/background structure of our 
perceptions. This is a major failing of the traditional conception of perception because, as 
explored, the background of a perception has transformative effects upon the quality of 
perceived objects. Objects change in quality as their colour-critical conditions change 
(Noë, 2004. p.129–131). Also neglected by the traditional conception of perception is the 
role that the observer plays in governing his perceptual experience—the way in which our 
motor capabilities impact our perceptions was explained.  
 
With this new theory of perception set out, the articulation of an appropriate theory of 
colour was the next objective. The traditional Subjectivist and Objectivist theories of 
colour were given and dismissed on the grounds of their weaknesses. Subjectivism leads us 
into a position of inescapable scepticism and Objectivism omits the phenomenality of 
colours entirely. A third theory, which pays adequate attention to the elements of 
perception—the perceiver, the object of the perceptions and the world in which the 
perceptions take place—was articulated. This theory is Alva Noë’s Phenomenal 
Objectivism. Phenomenal Objectivism posits that the colour of an object is not its power to 
prompt a coloured sensation, nor is it a property possessed by the object in the traditional 
sense. To Phenomenal Objectivism, colours are simply looks that alter when the 
relationship between the world and the object changes, i.e., when the background of one’s 
perceptions alters (ibid., p.141).  
 
This new theory of colour did not come without its flaws: Allen (2009) highlights the 
inconsistency of Phenomenal Objectivism: Noë argues that there is nothing more to 
colours than the way they look, whilst simultaneously arguing that ‘actual’ colours have a 
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role in informing the quality of these looks. Such incoherence was solved through making 
the distinction between non-perspectival looks and perspectival looks. Those looks that are 
only capable of being seen from particular perspectival circumstances are perspectival 
looks whereas those which can be seen from all perspectives are non-perspectival—if we 
think of Noë’s ‘actual’ colours as non-perspectival looks then the incoherency melts away. 
With this defence of the modified version of Phenomenal Objectivism shown to be 
persuasive, it was then noted that we are in a position where we can replace the 
problematic traditional theories of perception and colour with our own alternatives—
Perceptual Holism and the modified version of Phenomenal Objectivism. With this done, 
we were able to condemn the traditional theories to the past, and with this shift in paradigm 
we move into a position where Inversion can do no real damage—inversion, under this 
alternative paradigm, becomes no more philosophically interesting than colour blindness. 
This is due to the fact that we no longer need to worry about if our internal worlds 
correspond to the external world, because our theory simply does not engage with this 
distinction. We have no need for an internal world because we are in direct contact with 
the ‘external’ world. There is nothing about this alternative system that seems to suggest 
that the problem of inversion would arise naturally so to apply the Cartesian problem of 
inversion to a non-Cartesian system of perception does not seem to be anything more than 
a poorly motivated attempt to sustain the traditional hegemony of the Cartesian paradigm. 
To speak of inversion under our shifted paradigm is to overlay the problems of the past 
onto the present: a move that can be dismissed simply because there is not really any 
justifiable reason to make it. 
 
This work has sought to demonstrate that the problem of inversion is not of any real 
philosophical significance. It has done so by exploring the problems of the Cartesian 
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paradigm and articulating an alternative system unable to be derailed by inversion, 
complete with a complementary theory of perception and colour. With this move away 
from Cartesianism, inversion loses its potency—inversion belongs to Cartesianism, so 
inversion is left behind with the shift in paradigm. The exploration of this theory of 
perception can contribute further to the non-Cartesian system of understanding the mind 
would be a fruitful area of future research—with our society’s growing penchant for 
technology and innovation, it is imperative that we ensure that our theories of mind do not 
cling to inaccurate and troublesome relics from the past. Even those who would disagree 
with the arguments made in this paper or the theory of perception it articulates would do 
well not to neglect the arena of perception—our world—in their own theories, for to do so 
is to neglect a crucial factor in determining the quality of our experiences. It is hard to see 
how any theory of perception that neglects the worldliness of humanity would not suffer 
for doing so. 
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